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Articles
The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for

Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority
Ronald J. Mann*
Within the academic circles of commercial law, secured credit is about
as hot as a topic can get. For a good fifteen years, leading scholars have

argued contentiously about the most fundamental questions concerning
secured credit: not just about the policies that might justify the law's
protection of secured creditors, but more fundamentally about the seemingly obvious question of why businesses and their creditors choose to
grant collateral to secure their payment obligations.' The extensive and

inconclusive debate in the academic literature has not, however, undermined the confidence in secured credit exhibited by the law-reform
institutions of the profession. Rather, The American Law Institute and the

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are pressing ahead with a project that has as one of its avowed goals a significant
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, and Research Fellow, Olin
Center for Business, Law, and Economics. B.A., Rice University, 1982; J.D., University of Texas,
1985. I received particularly useful comments from John Drobak, Frances Foster, Bill Jones, Dan
Keating, Lynn LoPucki, Grant Nelson, Nancy Rapoport, Bob Rasmussen, Bob Thompson, George
Triantis, Jay Westbrook, James 1. White, and Dale Whitman. I also thank participants in a faculty
workshop at Washington University for their trenchant criticisms of an earlier version of this project
and acknowledge the able and diligent research assistance provided by Rebecca Berkeley and Kevin
Perez. Finally, I am indebted to the following companies, and especially the individual employees who
took time away from their productive affairs to aid my academic pursuits: The Boatmen's National
Bank of St. Louis (Carol C. Ballance, Richmond W. Coburn); BSI Constructors Inc. (Robert J.
Poelker); Chicago Title Insurance Company (Joseph C. Bonita); Disbursement Advisors, Inc. (John
C. Petersen); T. Barton French, Sr.; Gampco Incorporated (Allan M. Gallup); McCarthy (George
Scherer); Mark Twain Bancshares, Inc. (Jim Wood); Mercantile Bank of St. Louis N.A. (Harry C.
Mueller); Midland Development Group (Lee Wielansky); Murphy Company Mechanical Contractors
and Engineers (James J. Murphy, Jr.); NationsBank of Texas, N.A. (Cynthia C. Sanford); and Stewart
Title Guaranty Company (Jim Gosdin).
1. The debate started with Tom Jackson and Tony Kronman's provocative 1979 Yale Law Journal
article, Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors,88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979), and went into full steam with Alan Schwartz's 1981 Journalof
Legal Studies article, Alan Schwartz, SecurityInterests andBankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981), which challenged scholars to offer a credible explanation for
secured credit. The most recent substantial contribution to the debate is a 1994 conference at the
University of Virginia, which resulted in a lengthy symposium issue of the Virginia Law Review,
Symposium on the Revision ofArticle 9 ofthe Uniform CommercialCode, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783 (1994).
I have argued at length that the existing literature is deeply flawed by its failure to attend to contextual
differences and empirical evidence that are necessary to make any sense out of the actual pattern of
secured credit in the economy. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
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broadening of the scope of secured credit and the rights of secured

creditors. 2 That approach has broad support from many of the most prominent scholars in the field. Jim White, for example, recently published a
clarion call for a broad-ranging extension of the priority rights accorded to
creditors that file under Article 9.3
Although the use of collateral in the real-estate context is even more
important to the economy than its use in the personal-property context,4
the academic real-estate community has not entered into the debate about
the value of the institution of secured credit. The lack of engagement with
that debate is particularly surprising because the secured-credit debate has
coincided with the ambitious undertaking by The American Law Institute
to produce its first Restatement of Mortgages.5 In any event, the end

result has been the same as in the secured-credit context. The proposed
Restatement of Mortgages reflects the same approach as the revisions to
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: a general confirmation and

broadening of the priority of first-in-time consensual secured creditors. 6
Without taking issue with the specific provisions of the revised Article
9 and the Restatement, I do believe that the general approach those revi-

2.

See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF

ACCOUNTS,

CHATTEL PAPER,

AND

PAYMENT INTANGIBLES; CONSIGNMENTS

xv,

xxxii-xxxiii

(Discussion Draft Apr. 16, 1996) (discussion by Reporters and ALI Chairman of provisions extending
Article 9's provisions to payment intangibles and deposit accounts).
3. James J. White, Reforning Article 9 Prioritiesin Light of Old IgnoranceandNewFilingRules,
79 MINN. L. REV. 529, 535-36 (1995) (advocating a principle that White calls "First to File, the
King").
4. It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence about the total amount of secured lending, but the
statistics for federally insured financial institutions suggest that those institutions hold more than four
times as much debt secured by real property as they do debt secured by personal property.
Specifically, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation statistics indicate that as of the end of 1995, the
institutions that it insures (banks and savings associations) held more than half of their portfolios (about
1.7 trillion dollars) in loans secured by real estate; the remaining amount of commercial and industrial
loans was less than 700 billion dollars, and much of that probably was unsecured. DIVISION OF
RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, STATISTICS ON BANKING

C-6 tbl.RC-4, E-6 thl.RC-14 (1995); see BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERALREsERvE SYSTEM,
ANNUAL STATISTICALDIGEST: 1994, at 133 tbl.63 (1995) (reporting a survey of commercial and industrial lending by banks indicating that banks took collateral for 27% of their short-term loans and 63%
of their long-term loans).
5. The first installment appeared in 1991, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SEC.
(MORTGAGES) (Tentative Draft No. 1) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Subsequentinstallments appeared
in 1992 (TentativeDraft No. 2), 1994 (TentativeDraft No. 3), 1995 (TentativeDraft No. 4), and 1996
(Tentative Draft No. 5). The final draft was approved in May of 1996. See American Law Institute
NearsFinish Line on Lawyer Ethics, ProductLiability Projects, 64 U.S.L.W. 2739, 2739, 2747-48
(May 28, 1996).
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 2.2 (TentativeDraft No. 1, 1991) (enhancing the priority granted to a first-in-time lienor for future advances and especially for advances made to protect
collateral); id. § 4.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992) (enhancing the ability of a first-in-time lienor to
obtain a perfected interest in subsequently accruing rents); id. § 7.3 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1995)
(enhancing the ability of a first-in-time lienor to retain priority after modifications of the terms of its
debt).
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sions reflect is wrong: wrong because it simplistically fails to acknowledge
the limited benefits of first-in-time priority rules, and wrong because it
ignores contextual factors that can make alternate priority systems
superior.7 The purpose of this Article is to offer a new conception of lien
priority rules designed to structure analysis of the propriety of first-in-time
priority.
I start in Part I with the basic and traditional approach to the
economics of priority. I explain the two benefits of first-in-time priority:
simplicity that reduces transaction costs, and notice that allows subordinate
creditors to adjust their transactions to take account of the priority of
superior creditors. Although those benefits are important, previous scholars have glossed over the fundamental limitations on the reach of that
explanation: because the explanation relies heavily on the ability of
subordinate creditors to adjust, first-in-time priority is difficult to justify
when the creditors who are to be subordinate do not adjust to account for
their lack of priority. A system that subordinates without adjustment raises
concerns much more significant than a simple transfer of wealth from the
subordinate creditor to the prior creditor. When subordinate creditors do
not adjust to account for their lack of priority, the credit extended to the
debtor is mispriced in a way that subsidizes unduly risky enterprises and
thus undermines the efficiency of the credit market as a whole.
In Part II, I take the general analysis of Part I and use it to examine
a single common priority dispute: a contest between construction lenders
and the contractors that provide labor and materials to the project the
construction lenders finance. I argue that the multiplicity of contractors
limits the incentives of the contractors in two significant ways: it limits
their incentive to adjust the terms of their transactions to take account of
the risks of priority, and it limits their incentive to implement monitoring
and administrative mechanisms to reduce the risk of financial defalcation
by the owner or other parties involved in the transaction.

7. My criticism of the Restatement and Article 9 projects should not be taken as criticism of the
drafters of those projects. The institutions that organize those projects must accommodate constraints
on enactability that limit their ability to stray beyond conventional frameworks. In particular, the
Restatement is limited for the most part to rules that courts could adopt without statutory enactments.
The reforms that I advocate could not plausibly be adopted by judicial interpretation of existing rules,
but would require statutory enactments. Furthermore, with respect to the Restatement ofMortgages
in particular, my sense is that the Restatement of Mortgagesin fact goes much further than most such
projects in its willingness to update conventional rules to accommodate modem commercial practice.
See, e.g., REsTATEmENT, supra note 5, § 1.6 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996) (requiring the lender to
provide a statement of the nature of the debt owed to it); id. § 5.5 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996)
(stating that payments made to a previous holder of a note are effective unless the payor has received
notice of the assignment); id. § 6.4(b) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996) (requiring the lender to provide
a satisfaction of indebtedness); id. § 8.5 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996) (abandoning the merger
doctrine).
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Because my analysis hinges on my factual conclusions about the relative intensity of the assessment and monitoring practices of lenders and
contractors, I undertook a series of interviews of borrowers, contractors,
and lenders of various types with a view to assessing the accuracy of my
analysis.' As part of those interviews, I tried to get a sense for the
practicality of adopting my proposal to give contractors priority over
construction lenders. To evaluate that problem, I took advantage of the
existence of a legal system in Missouri that closely resembles my proposal,
by including a number of interviews with individuals that have experience
both under Missouri's unusual contractor-first rule and under the traditional
first-in-time rule generally followed in other states. Using the evidence
from those interviews, I argue that the legal system should grant the
contractors priority over the construction lenders because a system in which
the contractors have priority produces a more appropriate incentive to
assess and control the risk of financially unsound construction projects.
Because the analysis in Part II develops a proposal designed to
minimize the problem of nonadjusting creditors, Part I of the Article
addresses the possibility that other considerations make that proposal less
than optimal. Subpart 1H(A) addresses the tradeoff between certainty and
adjustment, with a focus on the limited reforms proposed by the
Restatement to enhance the priority of construction lenders. Although that
proposal might solve some of the difficulties of the current system, it
would not solve the problems related to risk assessment and control that are
the focus of this Article. Subpart II(B) addresses a variety of other
efficiency-related concerns posed by the partial-priority proposal Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried advanced in their recent Yale Law Journal
article.9 I argue that their proposal to limit the priority of first-in-time
lenders by granting partial priority for the second-in-time creditors provides
only a partial solution. The best approach in this context is a complete
abandonment of temporal priority, giving contractors complete priority
over the construction lenders, even if the construction lenders are first in
time.
I.

The Economics of Priority

In American law, the central principle for determining priority between competing lienholders is the simple notion that first in time is first
8. I recorded and transcribed the interviews to improve the accuracy and verifiability of the
conclusions that I draw from the interviews. Copies of the transcripts are availableupon request, as
are redacted copies of the relevant loan documents from a construction-loan transaction on which I
worked during 1995. For a more detailed justification of my interview methodology, see Mann, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 6-8).
9. Lucian Arye Bebchuk& JesseM. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J 857 (1996). "
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in right. Notwithstanding the foundational role of that principle, scholars

have done surprisingly little to justify it; for the most part it is taken for
granted without any substantial examination. A full-scale treatment could

examine priority rules from such perspectives as the autonomy of the party
granting the lien,' ° the fairness to competing claimants," or the effects
on the overall distribution of wealth.' 2 In this Article, however, I focus

on a single justification: maximization of wealth.13 Thus, I examine the
extent to which a first-in-time priority system can be justified as the system

that produces the greatest wealth for the parties affected by the transactions
that it governs, with a view to showing how departures from the first-intime rule can increase the net wealth of the affected parties. This Part

10. Under the autonomy-based argument, the same principles that call for protection of the right
of individuals to sell property also require protection of the lesser-included right to grant a lien in that
property. See David Gray Carlson, Rationality, Accident, andPriority UnderArnicle 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207, 212 (1986) ("The idea that one may only transfer what he
has leads to the priority rule 'first in time is first in right.'"); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., A Property-BasedTheory of SecurityInterests: TakingDebtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV.
2021, 2047-66 (1994) (discussing autonomy-related arguments for a first-in-time rule of priority). See
generally Ronald J.Mann,Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It
Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1022-53 (1995) (analyzing the implications of an autonomy-based
perspective for bankruptcy law). My sense, however (based largely on the reaction to my work in the
area), is that few commercial-law scholars would conclude that autonomy-basedprinciples require any
particular set of rules for lien priority. Rather, I think that most of those scholars would agree that the
government should be free (subject to distributional and fairness concerns) to adopt (or allow private
parties to adopt) rules that maximize the wealth of society. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note
9, at 932-34 (deprecating the significance of freedom of contract concerns in the allocation of lien
priority). On that point, I do not understand Harris and Mooney to argue that principles of autonomy
require a first-in-time priority rule. Instead, they seem to argue for a presumption in favor of free
transfer that could be rebutted if those opposing the first-in-time rule could demonstrate serious
distributional concerns. Harris & Mooney, supra, at 2053 (contending that opponents of the Article
9 priority system "must ... explain why, based on distributional concerns, the law should treat
security interests differently from other transfers of property interests"). In any event, this Article does
not examine the extent to which principles of autonomy might require recognition of a first-in-time rule
of priority, but instead proceeds on the premise that our commercial-law system should adopt rules of
lien priority designed to maximize the wealth of society as a whole.
11. For writings in that genre, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9, at 931-32 (suggesting that
fairness and bargain considerations provide a "normative principle" that cuts against full first-in-time
priority for secured creditors) and Carlson, supra note 10, at 253 (arguing that commercial law has an
"ineluctable" interest "in preserving the weak from the wicked"); see also White, supra note 3, at 532
(arguing that "most of us would agree that the legal consequences that attach to the first filing should
be fair and efficient" and defining "a rule as fair if it meets legitimate expectations of a reasonable
business person who is not necessarily familiar with the rule").
12. See, e.g., LynnM. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA.L. REV. 1887, 1916
(1994) (criticizing the institution of security as unjustifiably redistributing wealth from unsecured
creditors to secured creditors).
13. My choice of a wealth-maximization perspective is not based on any deep-seated conviction
that it is the "correct" perspective. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that a perspective that limits its
attention to questions of wealth maximization is seriously flawed. Mann, supra note 10, at 1020-22.
Rather, I choose that perspective based on an intuition that it is the perspective most likely to be useful
as a starting ground for analysis by most scholars in the community.
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offers a relatively abstract model of priority that summarizes the general
effects a priority system is likely to have on the production of wealth.
A.

The Benefits of First-in-TimePriority

Although the main thrust of this Article is to illustrate the limited
range within which first-in-time priority is appropriate, I do not mean to
suggest that we should abandon first-in-time priority entirely. Rather, as
I explain in this subpart, I believe that first-in-time priority provides

important wealth benefits in many contexts. My criticism is the more
modest point that the rule should be excluded from the contexts in which
it does not in fact provide those benefits. To make that criticism, I start
by outlining the benefits of first-in-time priority, which I divide into two'
separate categories: simplicity and adjustment. 5

1. Simplicity.-The most obvious benefits of a first-in-time priority
rule come under the heading of simplicity. A first-in-time priority rule
facilitates use of a filing system for determining priority, which parties can
use to give notice of their priority to other parties." 6 A first-in-time filing

14. My analysis does not discuss a further benefit noted by Hideki Kanda, Saul Levmore, and
George Triantis. Those scholars argued in paired submissions to the 1994 Virginia Law Review
symposium that first-in-time priority aids the parties by preventing the debtor from increasing the risk
of a lending transaction by subsequent issuance of debt. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore,
Explaining CreditorPriorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 2103, 2108-14 (1994) (arguing that the first-in-time
priority rule prevents a debtor from altering the lender's risk by issuing later debt that decreases the
likelihood that the first lender will be repaid); George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-FlowTheory of Secured
Debt and CreditorPriorities,80 VA. L. REv. 2155, 2155-56 (1994) (explaining that a "first-in-time
priority rule is justified as an impediment to subsequent debt financing arrangements that harm earlier
creditors"); see also George G. Triantis, A Theory ofthe Regulation ofDebtor-in-PossessionFinancing,
46 VAND. L. REv. 901, 911-12 (1993) (earlier consideration of that point). Although that argument
may identify one of the factors that motivates parties choosing between secured and unsecured debt (an
issue I discuss at length in Mann, supra note 1 (manuscript at 25-35)), it seems to me to have less
relevance to the topic at issue in this Article, in which the question is who will prevail in a contest
between two types of secured lenders.
15. Tom Jackson, Tony Kronman, and Alan Schwartz have argued that the first-in-time rule should
be adopted because it reflects the contract that sophisticated parties would select. Jackson& Kronman,
supra note 1, at 1149-58; Alan Schwartz, A Theory ofLoan Priorities,18 1. LEGAL STuD. 209, 235-41
(1989). That aspect of their analysis is not directly relevant here because the point of my analysis is
to examine the underlying operational effects of the rule. If we can determine that the economic effects
of the rule are negative, then I do not think that we should adopt the rule even if sophisticated parties
bearing all of the costs would select it. (Of course, it is unlikely that sophisticated parties bearing all
of the costs would select the rule if its effects in fact were negative; the fact that some parties select
it now is not particularly significant given that the parties subordinated by the rule frequently are not
parties to the contracts selecting the rule.) My sense is that Jackson, Kronman, and Schwartz would
agree with my general focus on wealth maximization, even if they did not accept the arguments regarding the effects of the rule that I present here.
16. See LYNN M. LoPucKi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
326-27 (1995). Absent some special contextual factors (like the ones discussed in this Article), a filing
system is not as effective in a priority system in which timing is not relevant because the party with
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system, in turn, can provide a simple way both to acquire priority and to
determine who has it. On the first point, the only costs necessary to
acquire priority under a first-in-time filing system are the costs of
determining the appropriate place to fie and of making filings in the
appropriate locations. Although those costs will not always be insignificant,'7 they can be considerably less than the analogous costs under alternative systems of allocating priority. Consider, for example, the most
common alternative system: requiring the lender to retain possession of the

collateral. Obtaining priority in that system requires the borrower to forgo
all of the value that the borrower obtains from having possession of the
collateral: if the lender takes possession of the borrower's manufacturing
equipment, the borrower cannot continue its manufacturing business.

8

The costs of possession to maintain priority will be minimal in cases in
which making valuable use of collateral does not require physical possession (as with a corporate bond), and those costs also can be mitigated by
devices that limit the lender's interference with the borrower's use of the
collateral. 9 In many contexts, though, the costs are likely to be far

greater than those under a simple first-in-time filing system, which readily
allows the borrower relatively unhindered use of the collateral.
Similarly, the only facts necessary to determine who has priority under
a first-in-time filing system are the dates of the relevant filings and
whatever facts are necessary to determine whether the filings are valid. In
the great run of cases, the costs of determining those facts are minimal.'

priority may come into existence after the subordinated party advances its loan. The fact that the
superior party can come along after the extension of credit by the subordinated party thus makes it
difficult for the subordinated party in a nontemporal system to determine whether it will have priority
by investigation at the time that it extends credit.
17. Peter Alces and Lynn LoPucki recently have argued that those costs are relatively large. See
Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MINN.L. REv. 679, 689-93 (1995) (reporting
the results of an empirical study of lender's attorney fees in more than 100 loan transactions secured
by personal property); Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of IncorporationShould Be the
Proper Placefor Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577, 597-98, 630-32
(discussing the costs of filing and the taxes associated with filing). I have argued that those costs rarely
are significant, but I do agree that they can be significant in some cases. Mann, supra note 1
(manuscript at 40-41).
18. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 123.
LEAL STuD. 53, 56 (1983) (emphasizing the costs of a rule requiring possession to perfect security
interests). For a thoughtful discussion of the costs and benefits of giving possession to the lender
during the term of the loan, see Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law:
Mesopotamia,Egypt, Israel,71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321,394-99 (1995) (discussing "antichretie" mortgages used in the ancient Near East).
19. For example, the lender could allow the borrower to retain physical possession, with the lender
maintaining only a stylized form of possession such as field warehousing. See, e.g., LOPUCKI &
WARREN, supra note 16, at 165-66 (discussing the motivations for field warehousing).
20. See Baird, supra note 18, at 64 (arguing that using benchmarks other than time would
complicate determinations of priority); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery andMyth of"Ostensible
Ownership and Article 9 Filing:A Critiqueof Proposalsto Extend FilingRequirements to Leases, 39
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First, the dates of the fflings can be determined by a simple search of the

relevant records.

Second, at least in a well-designed fling system, the

facts relevant to determining the validity of the filings will be simple and
objective matters that would not ordinarily be subject to serious dispute.'
Accordingly, in most cases the parties need not incur significant expenses

to determine who has priority under a first-in-time filing system.' Most
alternative systems for determining who has priority-those based on types
of claims, for example-will impose much greater costs in most cases,

because of the difficulty a creditor normally will face in determining
whether it will have priority over competing claimants.
2. Adjustment.-The second significant benefit of first-in-time priority
is that it enhances the ability of parties to adjust the terms of their
transactions to react to the priority of competing claimants. Because firstin-time priority protects each claimant from claimants that arrive later, the
first-in-time priority system allows new claimants to adjust the terms of
their transaction to account for the likelihood that the claims of competing
claimants will diminish the new claimant's likelihood of repayment. In a
first-in-time system, adjustment is simple: if a preexisting claimant has
priority, the new claimant can charge a higher price to compensate for the
risk of nonpayment; conversely, if there are no preexisting claimants, the
new claimant can set the terms of its transaction safe in the knowledge that

it will have priority over all subsequent claimants.'
Although some scholars have criticized the subordination of creditors

that do not have an opportunity to adjust as unfair,'" my analysis in this

ALA. L. REV. 683, 749-51 (1988) (discussing how a filing system can lower the costs of determining

who has priority in a particular asset).
21. "Certainty promotes efficiency because it allows the parties who do not wish to be governed
by the rule to know what and how to negotiate to avoid the rule. Certainty minimizes litigation and
the cost of litigation because outcomes are predictable." White, supra note 3, at 533; see Richard A.
Epstein, PastandFuture: The.TemporalDimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667,
670-71 (1986) ("[Making a clear decision one way or the other is of enormous importance. The relatively automatic quality of [a temporal priority] rule helps private parties organize their affairs without
resorting to litigation."); Mooney, supra note 20, at 751 (arguing that "f]iling provides definite, irrefutable evidence of the baseline time on which the first-in-time priority rule will be applied" and that
"[dietermining priorities based on the time of public filing reduces evidentiary costs and disputes in
connection with secured transactions"); White, supra note 3, at 535-36 (arguing that the extension of
first-to-file priority would enhance efficiency); cf. Menachem Mautner, "The Eternal Triangles of the
Law": Toward a Theory of Prioritiesin ConflictsInvolving Remote Parties,90 MICH. L. REv. 95, 13940 (1991) (arguing that the first-in-time rule favors parties that are likely to have greater reliance
interests at stake).
22. See also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9, at 872 (criticizing the "existing erosion of full
priority in the United States [because it] is ad hoc, creating unnecessary uncertainty for creditors").
23. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 20, at 745 ("A secured creditor will charge a lower interest rate
on account of receiving collateral only if it can rely with relative safety on the priority of its claim.").
24. See, e.g., Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 868-70 (discussing the bankruptcy principle that
bars nonconsensual subordination).
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Article emphasizes a different facet of the adjustment issue: the relation
between adjustment and the proper allocation of resources through the
credit market. I start from the obvious dependency of adjustment on timely
access to information necessary to determine priority. When each party
that extends credit to a borrower has full information about the likelihood

of nonpayment, each party can adjust the terms of its transaction so that the
net price that it charges for the extension of credit reflects the likelihood
that it will not be repaid.' Conversely, when a party does not have full
information about the likelihood of repayment because it does not know
whether it will have priority over competing claimants, it is unable to
calculate a price that accurately reflects the likelihood that it will be repaid.
For example, assume that two borrowers of apparently similar financial strength (Borrower One and Borrower Two) each approach a lender
(New Lender) seeking a loan for a term of one year. The only difference
between the two is that Borrower Two already has encumbered its assets

in connection with a prior loan from another lender (Old Lender). Assume
also that New Lender is willing to make loans to the borrowers at an interest rate of 10% per year if it is sure that it will have a prior right to
payment, but will insist on an interest rate of 12% per year if it will not
have priority, to take account of the increased risk of loaning money in a

subordinate position. Under a first-in-time system, New Lender will know
that it will have priority against Borrower One and thus will lend to
Borrower One at 10 %. Similarly, it will know that it will not have priority
with respect to Borrower Two and thus will lend to Borrower Two at 12%.

By facilitating the lender's ability to evaluate the risks of its borrowers, the
first-in-time system enhances the lender's ability to discriminate in its
pricing based on the riskiness of each of its borrowers.'

Because that

25. The examples that follow rely for ease of explication on adjustments limited to increases in
interest rates. As the empirical evidence in Part II of this Article suggests, the most common reactions
to perceptions of risk take other forms (see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text), but using interest rates allows me to present a numerical example that is simpler and easier to follow than any alternative that is obvious to me. Lynn LoPucki has argued with vigor that it is impracticable for unsecured
creditors to adjust the terms of their loans to take account of the relative riskiness of different
transactions. LoPucki, supranote 12, at 1935-36 & nn.181-82; see also Paul M. Shupack, Solving the
Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1067, 1095-98 (1989) (arguing that achieving
full risk neutrality by "offering either collateral or a sufficient risk premium" is implausible). As I
have explained elsewhere, his argument ignores the manifold devices that creditors use to compensate
for risk. See Mann, supra note 1 (manuscript at 60 n.193) (arguing that inventory suppliers compensate for credit risk by insisting on cash payment rather than offering credit to purchasers of doubtful
financial strength, by charging steep interest rates for deferred payment that disproportionately burden
weaker purchasers, and by taking security interests). Furthermore, the evidence presented in Part H
of this Article demonstrates that his argument cannot be reconciled with the actual practices of lenders
in the construction industry. To be sure, they may account for that risk by mechanisms other than increasing interest rates (such as increasing expenditures on prodedures for controlling risk), but they
account for it nonetheless.
26. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 220 (arguing that "the loan market would segment" if borrowers could make credible disclosures of priority debt, with the result that "[tihe good types would
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price discrimination tends to match the cost of the loan to the risk of
default, enhancement of the lender's-ability to set accurate prices enhances
the efficiency of the credit marketY
When creditors are unable to determine their priority, their inability
to adjust necessarily will result in mispricing of credit. That mispricing,
however, is not likely to be random. On the contrary, it will tend to
subsidize the risky borrowers, as a simple example will show. Take the
hypothetical discussed above, but assume that it would cost New Lender
5% of the loan amount to determine that it has acquired priority. In that
case, the parties rationally could conclude that it would not be worthwhile
for New Lender to spend the money to make sure that it had priority'
because the costs of acquiring and determining priority would exceed the
benefits of having priority.29
In that event, the likely reaction would be for New Lender to charge
a premium to all borrowers to account for the risk that it would not in fact
have priority.'° Thus, if New Lender believed that it would have priority
in only one-tenth of the cases, it could charge a priority-risk premium on
each loan of 1.8% per year, which would give it a total fund to account for
priority losses equal to 2% per year on the 90% share of the loans in
which it would not have priority. The effect of that system would be that
each borrower would pay the same, whether or not New Lender would
have priority with respect to that borrower's loan. Thus, Borrower Two
would get money at the same price as Borrower One, even though
Borrower Two presented New Lender with a riskier investment. To put
it another way, the uncertainty of priority would result in Borrower One

receive the low interest rate that reflected their debt-free status, and the bad types . ..would be
charged the highest interest rate').
27. See id. at 220 ("Each borrower would be charged the interest rate that reflects the social costs
of lending to it, and the creditors would be compensated accurately for the risks they bear.").
28. The analysis in the text assumes that the parties will act jointly to minimize the costs of the
loan. I defend that approach to analyzing borrowing decisions in Mann, supra note 1 (manuscript at
9-10).
29. Because the loan in the hypothetical has a term of one year, the parties probably would not
view it as prudent to expend 5 % of the loan amount to assure the lender of priority if the benefit to the
lender of having priority was an increased likelihood of payment valued at 2% of the loan amount per
year.
30. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1148-49 ("[f secret liens ... were legally
enforceable, creditors would either refuse to lend at much below the unsecured rate or would have to
incur substantial costs in policing their loans ...."); Schwartz, supra note 15, at 220. Describing the
approach taken by some lenders, Schwartz observes:
The sensibly conservative strategy for a lender operating in [a] legal environment [in
which lenders cannot determine whether they will have priority] is to assume that each
borrower it faces is bad with a high probability... [and to] charg[e] an interest rate that
is almost as high as the rate that would be exacted by a lender that believed with certainty
that it was dealing with a bad debtor.
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paying an extra charge to subsidize the loan to Borrower Two (1.8% per
year in the example). 3'
To generalize, the end result of a system in which it is not practical
for parties to acquire priority is a distortion of the economy to support
excessive investment in enterprises with questionable financial strength.
That suggests that first-in-time priority is preferable when it furthers

adjustment, but offers no reason to adopt first-in-time priority when it
hinders adjustment.
B.

The Limits of First-in-TimePriority

The most obvious thing about the economic justification for first-intime priority is its limited scope. The linchpin on which the justification
rests is the ability of the later creditor (who will be subordinate) to react

to the priority of the earlier creditor.3" To put it in the terms of my
hypothetical, the first-in-time priority system leads to accurate pricing only
when it is practical (and cost effective) for New Lender to determine
whether Old Lender exists and to adjust the terms of its loan to account for
the additional risk presented by Old Lender's priority.33

Thus, although the first-in-time system might be useful for thinking
about the high-finance world of large transactions among informed, sophis-

ticated parties, its unrealistic assumptions necessarily limit its general
probative value. As several scholars have noted, the concept of first-intime priority has at best limited validity in the context of involuntary
creditors.' Because involuntary creditors by definition did not engage in
a consensual lending transaction with their debtors, they cannot have had

an opportunity to adjust the terms of their transaction to account for the

31. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 220 ("'[G]ood' debtor types, rather than the lenders, would
bear the costs of any uncertainty concerning property rights .... ").
32. The text at this point ignores the simplicity-related benefits of the first-in-time rule. I argue
in subpart HII(A) that my proposed rule is not significantly worse on that score than the first-in-time
rule.
33. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9, at 881-82 (explaining that the easy case for full
priority for secured creditors is limited to a world with perfectly adjusting creditors).
34. See, e.g., Bebehuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 882-83 (characterizing as "a familiar point" the
notion that giving full priority to secured claims permits a firm to divert value from its tort creditors);
David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1649,
1646-49 (1991) ("Subordinating all lenders to tort claimants would eliminate the advantage of leverage,
and would remove the ability of corporate organizers to unilaterally determine an artificial level of
exposure to tort judgments."); LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1893, 1897-98 (discussing how the priority
of secured creditors allows firms to externalize tort risk); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal
Bankruptcy Rules and Social Tustice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (cataloguing the "ills of the
current regime" of according secured creditors priority over tort creditors); Robert K. Rasmussen &
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of CorporateBankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INsr. L.
REV. 85, 87 (1995) ("[C]ompensating tort claimants injured by the firm ahead of contractual creditors
... forces corporations to take into account the injuries their behavior imposes on third parties.").
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risk that their claims would not be paid because of the priority of other
creditors. Accordingly, subordinating their claims to the claims of priority
creditors inevitably results in underpayment of their claims. To the extent

that the claims of involuntary creditors sound in tort (as they generally do),
their subordination results in an improper diminution of the tort system's

incentives to avoid conduct that causes compensable harms.
What generally has gone unexamined, however, is that the problems

with first-in-time priority do not stop with involuntary claimants.35 For

first-in-time priority to make sense, it is not enough for creditors to have,
in a voluntary transaction with a borrower, an opportunity to adjust the
terms of their transaction to account for the risk of other creditors' priority.

For first-in-time priority to make sense, the creditors actually have to take
advantage of that opportunity: they have to adjust the terms of their transaction to account for priority risks. The reason is simple. If creditors

have an opportunity to adjust, but fail to adjust, three things will happen:
(1) the terms of lending transactions will not account for priority risks; (2)
high-risk borrowers and low-risk borrowers will obtain money at similar
prices; and (3) we will be back where we started, with a system that improperly subsidizes high-risk business enterprises.
It may seem odd for me to worry about what happens when a later-intime creditor has an opportunity to adjust to an earlier creditor's priority
but chooses not to do so. That worry, however, is born from my focus in

this Article on wealth maximization. The mere opportunity to adjust is relevant only from a perspective that is concerned about the fairness of
subordinating later-in-time creditors. From that perspective, the existence

of an opportunity to adjust is significant because a party that fails to take

35. The only significant exceptions of which I am aware appear in Lynn LoPucki's VirginiaLaw
Review article and in the recent article in the Yale Law Journalby Lucian Bebchuk and lesse Fried.
LoPucki argues that the law should take account of the unsecured creditors that fail to adjust because
of their lack of sophistication. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1956-58. As I explain below (see infra note
53), that concern does not play any role in my analysis because I am not willing to assume that contractors are systemically less sophisticated than construction lenders. I believe that there are sophisticated contractors, just as there are sophisticated construction lenders, and my practice in Texas during
the 1980s convinces me that construction lenders can be just as unsophisticated as contractors. If those
parties had the same incentives, I see no reason to doubt that their levels of sophistication would be the
same in the long run.
Bebchuk and Fried extend the analysis from involuntary creditors to "voluntary creditors with
small claims" and to certain types of prior voluntary creditors. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 88591. My analysis differs from theirs in two main respects. First, their analysis does not seem to me
to recognize the significance of the mispricing that results from failure to adjust: an inevitable subsidy
paid by the prudent for the benefit of the risky. More generally, I do not see any good reason to limit
reform to a diminution of priority for the first-in-time creditor. In the contexts in which my analysis
holds, the driving force is to enhance the incentives for adjustment, The partial-priority reform they
advocate provides only a partial enhancement of the incentives., Although they present a variety of
arguments in favor of the limited reform that they advocate, I believe (as I explain in subpart 11(B))
that those arguments have little or no force in the context I examine in this Article.
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advantage of the opportunity to protect itself has a diminished basis for
complaining when it is subordinated to a creditor about whom it knew (or
at least should have known). 36 From a wealth-maximizing perspective,
however, the opportunity to adjust is not directly valuable. It is valuable
only as a means to an end, and the end is the most precise and accurate
possible pricing in the market for credit. To the extent that adjustment
fosters accurate pricing, the ideal system-all other things being equal-is

the system that maximizes adjustment.
I do not distinguish between the decision to adjust and the opportunity
to adjust out of a desire to protect the eccentric, irrational, or unsophisti-

cated creditor that fails to take advantage of a profitable opportunity to
adjust, 7 or out of sympathy for a party that foolishly waives its right to
priority. Rather, I make that distinction because of my belief that in a

number of economically significant contexts transaction costs make it
rational for second-in-time claimants that have an opportunity to adjust to
refrain from adjusting to save the costs of adjustment. To defend that

belief, Part II of this Article provides a contextual analysis of the effects
of alternative priority rules in the construction-loan context.

II.

First-in-Time Priority in Context: Construction Contracting
In my view, there are several significant contexts in which application

of the first-in-time rule is questionable at best. In some, such as inventory

supply, practicalities limit the feasibility of first-to-file rules.3" In others,
first-in-time priority already has been abandoned, but existing rationales do
not adequately explain the rules that the system applies.39 The point of
36. See supra note 11 (citing representative scholarship evaluating rules of lien priority based on
fairness).
37. But see LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1956-58 (advocating reforms to benefit unsophisticated
creditors).
38. The problem in the inventory-supply context is that the disproportionately high expenses that
the supplier would incur if it attempted to file against all of its customers' locations can result in
suppliers failing to take a security interest not because of the economics of the underlying transaction,
but because of the ineffectiveness of the current filing system. See LynnM. LoPucki, Computerization
of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the Electronic Highway, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1992, at 5, 26-27; Letter from R.O. Wirengard, Eveready Battery Co., Inc., to
William M. Burke, Chairman, American Law Institute Drafting Committee, Revision of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code 2 (July 31, 1995) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (discussing that
problem and urging an "implicit trade lien" in favor of inventory suppliers).
39. The main situation that I have in mind here is the problem of purchase-money priority, which
has attracted considerable discussion among academics. For a sampling of the literature, see F.H.
Buckley, The Bankruptcy PriorityPuzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1461-70 (1986) (criticizing purchasemoney priorities as unjustified); Kanda & Levmore, supra note 14, at 2138-41 (defending Article 9's
rules on purchase-money priorities as striking "a difficult balance" between the danger to earlier
creditors of risk alteration and the benefit to society of efficiency gained through later-in-time
decisionmaking); and Paul M. Shupack, Defending PurchaseMoney Security Interests Under Article
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this Article, however, is not to provide a detailed discussion of all of the
different doctrinal rules about priority. Rather, my point is to offer a
general framework for allocating priority. To further that end, it is better

to provide a single illustration with sufficient attention to context' to
demonstrate how my analysis would apply in other situations. For a number of reasons, the construction-loan context is particularly well suited to
illustrate my analysis. To begin with, the rules of priority that apply there
have peculiar importance because construction lending combines significant
economic impact with an unusually high level of default.4 ' Furthermore,

it is widely agreed that the existing state of the law is wholly unsatisfactory. The most ridiculed aspect of the system is its reliance on a vague
distinction that grants priority to advances that are "obligatory," but not to
those that are "optional." 2 Furthermore, aside from the vagueness of the
lien priority rules, the desire of courts and legislators to protect the

9 of the U.C.C. from ProfessorBuckley, 22 IND. L. REv. 777, 783-97 (1989) (describing the benefits
of the U.C.C.'s purchase-money priority system). The considerations relevant to purchase-money
priority problems closely resemble the considerations that occur in several other situations in which the
law already grants priority to later-in-time creditors that add value. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(c)
(1994) (granting priority for expenses during bankruptcy proceedings that enhance the value of
collateral); Cagan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 28 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1994) (granting common-law
priority to a later-in-time receiver for the costs of preserving collateral). I thank Dan Keating for
pointing out the connection among those rules.
40. See Mann, supra note I (manuscript at 6-7, 63) (arguing that the scholarship about secured
credit has been insufficiently attentive to the differing contexts in which secured credit is used).
41. See, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Construction Claims in Bankruptcy: Making the Best ofa Bad
Situation, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 343 & n.2 (1995) (citing statistics about the size of the construction
industry and its "notoriously high" rate of failure); see also TelephoneInterview with Joseph C. Bonita,
Chief Underwriting Counsel, Chicago Title Insurance Company 8 (Dec. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Bonita
Interview] (transcript on file with the TexasLawReview) (describing lien claims in constructionprojects
as "a big loss factor"); Interview with Jim Wood, Vice President, Mark Twain Bancashares, Inc., in
St. Louis, Mo. 8 (Jan. 11, 1996) (hereinafter Wood Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law
Review) ("[Clonstruction lending is probably the riskiest thing you can do, as far as real-estate lending,
[with a few exceptions].").
42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, Reporters' Memorandum, at xx (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1991) (explaining that the "traditional majority view ... has proven unpredictable and extremely
confusing in practice"); James B. Hughes, Jr., FutureAdvance Mortgages:Preserving the Benefits and
Burdens of the Bargain,29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1101, 1115-17 (1994) (discussing "the lack of clear
standards" for determining who has priority); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Rethinking Future
Advance Mortgages:A Brieffor the RestatementApproach, 44 DUKE L.J. 657, 659-60 (1995) (arguing
that "[t]he traditional common law approach ... has proved inadequate and should be discarded").
Dissatisfaction with that system has led to a rule in the new Restatement of Mortgages that
significantly broadens the first-in-time priority rule in the construction-loan context.
See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 2.3(a), at 88 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1991) ("If a mortgage secures
future advances, all such advances havethe priority ofthe original mortgage."); see also id., Reporters'
Note, at 99 ("It would be simpler [than existing solutions] . . . merely to renounce the [existing
approach], and to declare that all future advances take the priority of the original mortgage."). The
reform also alters a number of other aspects of the law related to future-advances mortgages, which are
beyond the scope of this Article. For a lucid explanation and defense of the entire topic, see Nelson
& Whitman, supra, at 686-703.
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contractors that supply the labor and materials that build a project has
given rise to a body of confusing judicial and statutory rules that limits the

value of whatever lien priority the lenders might appear to have.'
Second, it is an area in which it seems to me relatively easy to
demonstrate how first-in-time priority can fail even with respect to voluntary creditors. To defend that view, this Part proceeds in two steps. First,

subpart A presents a relatively abstract analysis of the incentives of the
parties, designed to show why first-in-time priority should not work in this
context. Second, subpart B explains the empirical evidence I have gathered
to support my abstract analysis, to show that first-in-time priority in fact

does not work in this context.
A.

A Model of Incentives in the Construction-LoanContext

The basic construction-loan transaction involves three different types
of actors: a borrower in the business of developing real estate; a lender

(typically a bank)' in the business of lending money to finance construction; and a large number of contractors, each of whom is in the
business of providing labor or materials used in construction. Because the
construction lender normally agrees to finance the project before construc-

tion begins, the construction lender normally has the ability to ensure that
it is the first to file, so that it would have priority under a strict first-intime priority system.' The borrower typically enters into contracts with
architects, engineers, and other contractors providing for the construction

of the building.' Usually much of the work of actual construction will
be provided by a general contractor through one or more tiers of subcontractors. 47 In that case, the amount of the contract with the general
43. See Curtis R. Reitz, ConstructionLenders' Liability to Contractors, Subcontractors, and
Materialmen, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 416 (1981) (discussing judicial and statutory provisions that protect
contractors and subcontractors against construction lenders).
44. FDIC statistics indicate that federally insured banks held about $69 billion of construction and
land-development loans at the end of 1995. DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FEDERAL
DEPOsIT INSURANCE CORP., supra note 4, C-6 tbl.RC-4.
45. The liens of the competing contractors normally will have a priority date no earlier than the
date on which construction commenced. See, e.g., 2 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.4, at 188-89 (3d ed. 1993) (Practitioner Treatise Series) (summarizing
differing approaches to determining the date from which mechanics' liens have priority). I emphasize
that the construction lender will have the opportunity to obtain priority over the mechanics' liens
because it appears that construction lenders frequently fail to act with sufficient care to obtain that
priority. See Bonita Interview, supra note 41, at 3 ("[E]ven [in] states in which priority for the lender
is legally possible ... a large, large number of the transactions simply don't have it because they
mistimed it or something.").
46. For a good general discussion of the contracting process, see 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 45, § 12.2, at 155-58.
47. Alternatively, the owner might hire a constructionmanager and contract directly with a variety
of parties providing labor and materials related to construction. See, e.g., Ponoroff, supra note 41,
at 345 n.5 (describing the use of construction managers). My analysis would apply in that context as
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contractor will include amounts necessary to pay the direct charges of the
general contractor, as well as amounts due to all of the subcontractors that
the general contractor plans to hire to perform construction."
When first-in-time priority elevates the rights of the construction
lender over those of the contractors, a failure of the project will leave the

contractors significantly exposed because the value of the uncompleted
project will go first to pay the construction lender: the contractors are

entitled to payment only out of any excess remaining after the construction
lender has been paid in full. 49 Thus, because the contractors bear the
primary risk of loss, it is the contractors as a group that have the primary
incentive to account for and minimize that risk. Conversely, the construction lender has a diminished incentive to worry about losses because
it will be paid in full so long as the 5°
project is worth the money that the
invested in it.

construction lender has

By dividing the incentive to account for and prevent losses among the
multiple contractors, first-in-time priority leads to two distinct problems.
The first problem is the adjustment problem discussed in Part I. Because
of the large number of subordinated contractors, no individual contractor
has an adequate incentive to adjust its pricing for the risk that the
construction lender's priority will prevent the contractor from getting
paid."' As explained in Part I, that failure to adjust results in an
well because the parties that provide labor and materials still would be entitled to liens to secure the
owner's obligation to pay them.
48. See Interview with GeorgeScherer, Chief Financial Officer, McCarthy, in St. Louis, Mo. 1213 (Dec. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Scherer Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law Review)
(statement of the chief financial officer for a large general contractor that his company typically
subcontracts out about 75-80% of its work).
49. See LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 16, at 527-31; 1 NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 45,
§ 7.31, at 669-72 (both summarizing general rules for the distribution of proceeds of a foreclosure on
a property involving multiple lienholders).
50. I do not mean to suggest that granting priority to the construction lender vitiates that lender's
risk of loss. As any lender making construction loans will say, the risk of loss is quite significant even
with priority. See Interview with Hariy C. Mueller, Senior Vice President, Mercantile Bank of St.
Louis N.A., in St. Louis, Mo. 14 (Dec. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Mueller Interview] (transcript on file
with the Texas Law Review) (describing the risk of loss on projects in which the construction lender
has priority over the contractors). The risk of loss is, however, necessarily less than it would be if the
contractors had priority over the construction lender. Accordingly, the costruction lender's incentive
to respond to the risk is lower. As discussed in the text, the evidence from my. interviews strongly
suggests that the alteration of priority is enough to make a noticeable difference in lending practices.
See infra section II(B)(2).
51. Although the general contractor generally will have a greater incentive to worry about losses
than other contractors, that does not undermine my thesis that putting the risk of loss on contractors
rather than the construction lender substantially diminishes the incentive to prevent losses. First, the
amount of the general contract typically amounts to only 75-80% of the construction loan. See Scherer
Interview, supra note 48, at 13. Second, even with respect to that 75-80% amount, the risk of loss is
heavily fractionated because the general contractor typically subcontracts a considerable portion of the
work to be done under the general contract and because the contracts with the subcontractors normally
include "pay-when-paid" provisions, which allow the general contractor to defer payment to
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inefficient mispricing of credit. The second problem arises from the nature
of the events most likely to lead to default in this context. Here, many of
the defaults result from events that can be controlled by the parties (such
as theft or misapplication of funds by the borrower or general contractor).5 2 By putting the risk of loss on a large number of contractors, firstin-time priority places the risk of loss on parties that do not individually
have an adequate incentive to adopt procedures to control that risk.53
Consider a simplified example of a construction loan from Bank to
Developer in the amount of $1 million. Developer plans to construct a
building with labor and services contributed by twenty different contractors
and subcontractors. Each of the contractors will have an equal claims4

subcontractors until it receives payment from the owner. See Interview with James I. Murphy, Jr.,
President, Murphy Company Mechanical Contractors and Engineers, in St. Louis, Mo. 3 (Jan. 23,
1996) [hereinafter Murphy Interview] (transcript on file with the Texa Law Review) (statement of a
subcontractor that it has no obligation to pay its subcontractors until it is paid by the general
contractor); Interview with Robert J. Poelker, Vice President, Finance& Accounting, BSI Constructors
Inc., in St. Louis, Mo. 5 (Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Poelker Interview] (transcript on file with the
Texas Law Review) (description by a general contractor of pay-when-paid provisions included in its
subcontracts); Scherer Interview, supra note 48, at 12 (explaining that a general contractor does not
bear all of the risk of loss from deferred payment because that type of loss "all works itself down the
food chain"); see also AMERICAN INsr. OF ARCHITECTS, STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CONTRACTOR AND SuBCONTRACToR §§ 11.3, 12.1 (1987) (standard pay-when-paid provisions).
Although the New York Court of Appeals recently invalidated a pay-when-paid provision that placed
the ultimate risk of loss from nonpayment on a subcontractor, even that decision recognized the validity
of provisions that pass the risk of late payment to subcontractors. See West-Fair Elec. Contractors v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 661 N.E.2d 967, 971 (N.Y. 1995). Because losses from late payments constitute thebulk of losses that contractors suffer on constructionprojects, see Scherer Interview, supranote
48, at 11-12, the clear validity of pay-when-paid provisions to transfer those losses to subcontractors
has the effect of passing most of the risk of nonpayment from the general contractor to its subcontractors.
52. See, e.g., Bonita Interview, supra note 41, at 4 (explaining that the mechanics' lien risk can
be "reduced by orders of magnitude by seeing to it that everybody's paid"); Interview with John C.
Petersen, President, Disbursement Advisors, Inc., in St. Louis, Mo. 5 (Jan. 23, 1996) [hereinafter
Petersen Interview] (transcript on file with the TexasLawReview) (stating that "the only way to be sure
[that money has not been embezzled] is to know where the money went").
53. My analysis focuses on the multiplicity of the contractors, rather than their sophistication.
Thus, I do not rely at all on the possibility that the increased sophistication of lenders makes them
cheaper cost avoiders than contractors. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, PropertyRules
and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 447-49 (1995)
(discussing the idea that entitlements should be assigned to place the risk of loss on the cheapest cost
avoider). To the extent that contractors lack the sophistication and expertise that banks have in
evaluating and controlling credit risks, a rule elevating the priority of contractors should improve affairs
even more. I have not relied on that factor in my analysis, though, because I doubt that differences
in sophistication have long-run significance. But see LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1956-58 (urging
reforms to protect unsophisticated creditors). In particular, although some might believe that banks are
more sophisticated under current conditions, I see no reason to doubt that in the long run sophisticated
contractors and lenders faced with similar incentives would be equally effective at assessing and
controlling risks.
54. Although it is unrealistic to assume that each contractor will have an equal claim, the
assumption does not undermine the validity of my model. See supra note 51.
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against the project for $50,000.15 Assume that the contractors would
believe, based on general experience in the industry and without any

contract- or project-specific investigation, that a reasonable estimate of the
expected loss to each contractor from failure of the project is $300'6:
three percent of the projects fail and each contractor loses 20% of its claim
on each failure (for a total loss of $200,000 in this hypothetical)5
Now assume that each contractor could do two things to assess and

control the risk of the project. First, by expending $2,000 to evaluate the
credit of Developer and the viability of the project, a contractor could place
the project into one of two classes: good projects and bad projects. Good
projects (90% of all projects) have a total expected loss from failure of
$2,000.58 Bad projects (10% of all projects) have a total expected loss
from failure of $42,000."' Second, by expenditure of an additional
$2,000 to implement heightened monitoring and disbursement procedures,
the amount of the loss in cases of distress could be reduced by 60%: from

$200,000 in each case to $80,000 in each case.

55. For simplicity, I have chosen to have the amount of the construction loan equal the amount
due to the contractors working on the project. That does not indicate that I am making the unrealistic
assumption that the lender is funding 100 %of the costs of the project. Rather, it reflects the likelihood
that the amount due to the contractors working on the project is likely to be significantly less than the
total costs of the project. That will be true because of, among other things, the costs of acquiring the
land and the "soft" costs likely to have been incurred long before construction began. See Scherer
Interview, supranote 48, at 12-13 (stating that a typical arrangement would involve a construction loan
for about 80% of the total cost of the project and a general contract for about 75-80% of the amount
of the construction loan); Interview with Lee Wielansky, President, Midland Development Group, in
St. Louis, Mo. 1 (Dec. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Wielansky Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas
Law Review) (stating that construction lenders will advanceup to 90-95% of his construction costs, on
projects that seem to me extremely conservative); Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 2 (statement of
a lender specializing in $500,000 to $1 million construction loans that it usually advances the lesser of
the total cost of the project or 75-80 % of the estimated value of the completed project).
56. Given the difficulty of directly observing default and loss rates, I do not claim that the rates
used in my hypothetical accurately reflect reality. I have chosen the three percent default rate as
approximating the cumulative rate of default during the first two years on a class B corporate bond, as
reported in Christine Chmura, A Loan Pricing Case Study, I. COM. LENDING, Dec. 1995, at 23, 28.
The loss rates are arbitrary estimates based on my experience in private practice. In any event, the
actual figures are not necessary to my analysis; they are designed simply to illustrate the hypothetical
effect caused by fractionation of incentives. My argument that the effect is real rests on the empirical
evidence discussed in subpart II(B).
57. The hypothetical assumes for simplicity that the bad projects will be worth $1.8 million, so
that the construction lender will be paid in full and the contractors will lose $200,000. The $300 figure
is the product of the total loss on failure ($200,000), the risk that the loss will occur (3%), and the
contractor's share of that loss (5%).
58. I arbitrarily assigned to good projects a 99% chance of successful completion, a 1% chance
of failure, and a loss of $200,000 on each failure.
59. I arbitrarily assigned to bad projects a 79% chance of successful completion, a 21% chance
of failure, and the same $200,000 loss upon failure. Aggregation of the 10 % risk of a 21% failure rate
(on bad projects) and the 90% risk of a 1% failure rate (on good projects) produces the 3% overall
failure rate described in the preceding paragraph.
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Consider first the possibility that an individual contractor would spend
the $2,000 to investigate the caliber of the project and Developer. In an
ideal world with perfect and costless knowledge, each contractor would

charge $50,100 for a good project and $52,100 for a bad project.'

The

problem, though, is that no rational contractor would spend more than
$300 to investigate the project to find out if it is good or bad because $300
is the expected loss a contractor faces from a failure of the project if it
does not know whether the project is good or bad.6' Because the costs

of the investigation and monitoring in the hypothetical are $2,000, no
rational contractor would undertake the investigation. Similarly, a rational
contractor would not incur the $2,000 monitoring cost because that sum far
exceeds the $180 benefit each contractor would gain from the monitoring.62 Thus, no individual contractor would take steps to assess or
control the risk; instead, each contractor would charge a risk premium of
$300 to compensate it for the risk of loss from failure of the project. The
result, then, is that both good and bad projects will pay the same $50,300
price, even though they have strikingly different risk profiles. Thus, the
relatively uncommon bad projects get a subsidy from the more common
good projects.'
The incentives would change significantly if priorities were reversed,
so that the contractors had priority over the Bank. In that case, when a
bad project resulted in a shortfall of $200,000, it would be the Bank that
would bear the loss, not the contractors." Because the Bank would bear
all of that loss, the expected loss to the Bank on each project if it did not
attempt to distinguish between good and bad projects would be $6,000.

60. Each contractor should charge an amount equal to its $50,000 costs plus a premium to account
for its 5% share of the amount that would be lost upon failure of the project. Because good projects
bear an expected loss of $2,000, each contractor would charge a $100 risk premium on good projects
(5% of $2,000); because bad projects bear an expected loss of $42,000, each contractor would charge
a $2,100 risk premium on bad projects (5% of $42,000).
61. For a similar analysis, see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9, at 885-87 (arguing that small
creditors may not have an adequate incentive to adjust). For simplicity, I assume that there is no
likelihood of adverse selection.
62. The $180 figure is 60% of the individual contractor's expected loss of $300.
63. Bebchuk and Fried offer a similar numerical example, explaining why individual small creditors would be better off charging a risk premium than expending funds to evaluate risk on a case-bycase basis. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9, at 886-87. Their framework, however, is considerably
less detailed than mine. First, they do not consider the possibility that the level of risk is itself a
variable subject to control by the lender; my framework assumes that lenders will react to a perception
of risk by expending funds to adopt procedures that will reduce the risk. Furthermore, Bebchuk and
Fried do not identify the subsidy for risky projects that follows inevitably from a price structure in
which lenders rationally refrain from spending funds to assess risk in the first place.
64. As I explained supra at note 57, my simple hypothetical assumes that bad projects will be
worth $1.8 million, which will produce enough to pay the contractors all of their $1 million in claims,
but will leave the Bank $200,000 short.
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Accordingly, it would be rational for the Bank to expend $2,000 to distinguish between good and bad projects."

Similarly, it will be in the Bank's interest to spend the $2,000 to
implement monitoring procedures to limit the amount of the loss on projects that fail, but only on the riskier projects. The $2,000 cost of those
procedures would be more than the expected benefit of $1,200 on the good
projects.' By contrast, the cost of those procedures would be much less
than the benefit of $25,200 on the bad projects.67 After those expenditures, the Bank will be able to price its loan for each project in a way
that takes account of the risk of failure and minimizes that failure when it
is efficient to do so. Thus, the Bank will charge $1,004,000 for good
projects 68 and $1,020,800 for bad projects.'
In sum, my model shows how uniting the risk of loss in a single party

enhances the incentive to investigate the risk of loss and thus increases the
likelihood that the credit system will separate or discriminate between good
and bad projects. Uniting that risk also enhances the incentive to incur

expenditures for enhanced monitoring that may be appropriate in riskier
projects. Thus, uniting the risk of loss enhances the efficiency of the
system in two ways: by diminishing the gap between the private and social

cost of construction projects, and by decreasing the losses from the inevitable failed projects.7
65. The expenditure of the funds would not be rational because of any reduction in the bank's risk
of loss: the bank would be able to charge a risk premium equal to the anticipated loss even if it did not
expend those funds. It would be rational because it would allow the bank to charge lower prices for
the better projects. A rational borrower with a good project would prefer for the bank to expend the
funds to distinguish between good and bad projects because that expenditure would result in a lower
total price for the loan. In this example, the expenditure would reduce the charge on good loans from
$1,006,000 (the $1,000,000 in costs plus the $6,000 expected loss on a loan of unknown quality) to
$1,004,000 (the $1,000,000 in costs, plus the $2,000 assessment fee, plus the $2,000 expected loss on
a good loan). Accordingly, borrowers would be willing to submit to that expenditurebecause a refusal
to submit to that expenditure would signal the borrower's belief that it had a bad project.
66. The $1,200 figure represents 60% of the bank's expected loss of $2,000 on good projects.
67. $25,200 is 60% of the bank's expected loss of $42,000 on bad projects.
68. $1,004,000 is the $1 million loan amount, plus the $2,000 information costs, plus $2,000 to
account for the risk of loss from the failure of a good but poorly monitored project.
69. $1,020,800 is the $1 million loan amount, plus the $4,000 information and monitoring costs,
plus $16,800 to account for the remaining risk of loss on a bad but well-monitored project.
70. Strategic considerations suggest to me that construction lenders should not be permitted to
circumvent the system I propose by obtaining advance waivers of priority from individual contractors.
If lenders differentiate between good and bad projects and contractors do not, a system allowing lenders
to obtain enforceable advance lien waivers might end up functioning even worse than a first-in-time
system, because of the ability of lenders to obtain lien waivers only on bad projects. It is important
to distinguish those advancewaivers (which my system would not enforce) from the common practice
under which construction lenders refuse to advance funds without requiring contractors to "waive" any
right to a lien for past work. See generally 2 NELSON & WHIRTMAN, supra note 45, § 12.4, at 191-92
(distinguishing between "no-lien" clauses and course-of-constructionlien waivers). As I explainbelow,
the course-of-construction lien waiver seems to me an integral and valuable part of the system for
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A common response of readers of drafts of this Article has been that
contractors could solve the problems discussed above by entering into joint
arrangements for risk assessment and monitoring, so that each would bear
its pro rata share of those costs. That solution, however, requires the
parties to bear the costs of forming those arrangements. Those costs could
be saved entirely by adoption of my approach, which results in a risk
united without the incurrence of transaction costs. 7'
Another objection to my system is that it might increase the price that
construction lenders charge for construction loans and (if contractors are
not currently charging for all of the risk) that the increased charges might
cause some proposed projects to fail for lack of financing that would be
available under a first-in-time rule. But I see nothing wrong with that
result because the only projects that would be deterred would be projects
that could be supported only because of the failure of contractors to charge
a price that reflected the actual risk of the project.'
B.

Risk of Loss in the Construction-LoanContext: An Empirical View

The abstract economic analysis of subpart A presents a comparison
between two simple priority systems-one in which construction lenders
have priority (a first-in-time system) and one in which contractors have
priority (a nontemporal contractor-first system)'73-and concludes that the
latter system would improve the allocation of financial resources by causing
more accurate pricing of credit. Because that analysis is highly stylized
and relies on a number of reductionist assumptions, I find it insufficient
standing alone to support the significant legal reform that this Article
urges.

controlling the risk of defalcation by the owner and the general contractor. See infra note 102 and
accompanying text (discussing course-of-construction ihen-waiver requirements in construction-loan
disbursement procedures).
71. Cf. Krier & Schwab, supra note 53, at 470-71 (suggesting that the risk of loss should be
placed on the "best chooser" and that "[i]n most instances, the best chooser will be the smallest-number
party"). The fact that the marketplace does not contain such arrangements even though they would be
beneficial for contractors suggests that the costs of forming and enforcing them would be likely to
exceed the benefits that they could provide. Given the large number of contractors involved in significant construction projects, that result is not surprising.
72. Cf. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 917-21 (arguing that a partial diminution of the first-intime priority rule generally would limit financing only for projects that are unduly risky); LoPucki,
supra note 12, at 1910-11 (arguing that giving tort creditors first priority would deter only activities
that generate more tort liability than profit). For a mathematical formulation of the excessively risky
incentive of borrowers to pass the risk to creditors that will not be paid in the event of loss, see
Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy:Me-Firstand OtherPriorityRules, 11 BELL 1.
ECON. 550, 556-60 (1980).
73. I purposely refer to the rule that I propose as a contractor-first rule rather than a last-in-time
rule to emphasizethe nontemporal nature of my approach: the contractors should have priority whether
they are first or last.
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To respond to that concern, I attempted to verify empirically the key
factual conclusion that drives my analysis: the single construction lender
is more likely to act to assess and control the risk of loss on a construction
project than the multiple contractors that contribute labor and services to
the project. The research consisted of two general steps. First, during the
summer of 1995, I participated in the negotiation and drafting of documents for a mid-sized ($30 million) construction loan on a shopping center.
Second, during the winter of 1995, I conducted a series of fourteen interviews with a variety of participants in the construction business: borrowers,
lenders, contractors of various sizes and specialties, title insurers, and
construction consultants. Those interviews provided considerable evidence
to support the validity of my model: evidence that lenders in fact do more
than contractors to assess and control risk, and evidence of the feasibility
of a contractor-first system. I address those points in turn.
1. Responding to Risk in General.
a. Assessing risk.-The central premise on which my analysis of
construction contracting rests is the assertion that a single construction
lender is more likely to assess the risk of loss from a construction project
and adjust the terms of its transaction to account for that risk than the body
of contractors subordinated by a vigorous application of first-in-time
priority. Practice in the construction industry provides considerable (albeit
anecdotal) support for that premise.
The strongest support rests on the categorical difference between the
ways that lenders and contractors react to differing levels of risk in a
proposed construction project. Although sophisticated contractors are
careful to evaluate the financial strength of the parties with whom they
deal,74 they tend to evaluate the financial information that they acquire
under a relatively blunt standard, dividing projects into two categories:
acceptable and unacceptable. If the contractor believes that the financial
position of the owner and the project is unacceptable, the contractor
declines to participate. If the contractor believes that the financial evidence
meets that minimum standard, the contractor typically does not discriminate
further in setting the terms on which it will do business. The perspective
of the chief financial officer of one large general contractor is illustrative:
"IY]ou couldn't put enough money in there, to be honest with you, to
74. The chief financial officer of the largest general contractor to whom I spoke explained that
before doing a project with a company that was "not a household name brand like Motorola" he typically would seek information about the company's financial strength from Dun & Bradstreet and his
company's investment bankers. Scherer Interview, supra note 48, at 13. He went on to explain: "If
they're a private corporation we're not shy at all about asking for financial information. Sometimes
it puts them off... [but] [w]e have to do our due diligence [for] our shareholders ...." Id. For
similar descriptions of pre-bid financial investigation by a subcontractor and a general contractor,
respectively, see Murphy Interview, supra note 51, at 4-5 and Poelker Interview, supra note 51, at 6.
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cover the downside risks if the job falls apart."' When I asked him if
he "put a little more in [the bid]" to account for a greater risk of loss in
questionable cases, he responded negatively: "I really don't think we do

it." 76 Similarly, the president of a $170-million-per-year subcontractor

explained: "[W]e'd rather be preventive about the situation, and have a
good feel for what we're going into such that we're at the level that we're
not going to have financial, payment-oriented problems." 77 As he con-

cluded, if he has concerns about the financial strength of the owner or the
contractor: "We just will not quote the job."7" Yet another general contractor executive acknowledged that financial concerns did not normally
enter into his pricing decisions, but concluded that "if we would have a
doubt [about the owner's financial strength], we probably would decline to
bid." 79 In sum, under that apparently typical approach, all acceptable
projects receive the same financial terms from the contractor.'

In contrast, construction lenders discriminate much more precisely in
setting terms to account for the risk of loss in construction transactions.
The simplest way lenders can discriminate is by altering the nominal price
of the transaction: raising or lowering the interest rate to reflect the
lender's judgment of the risk of the particular transaction. It is clear that
lenders do not charge a single interest rate for all construction projects;

rather, they charge different rates based on such things as the strength of
the borrower and the general contractor, the lender's prior relationship with
the borrower, and the perceived riskiness of the project. 8

75. Scherer Interview, supra note 48, at 14. My impression is that the reason the contractor
would not be able to put enough money in to compensate for risk is not that the necessary sum would
be incalculable, but that inclusion of a full risk premium would make the bid uncompetitive. For
example, the only contractor that suggested to me that he did attempt to take the risk of loss into
account in setting his contract price followed that statement with an anecdote in which the owner
advised the contractor that it was pointless for the contractor to submit a bid after the contractor
expressed concern about the owner's solvency. See Interview with Allan M. Gallup, President,
Gampco Incorporated, in St. Louis, Mo. 4 (Jan. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Gallup Interview] (transcript
on file with the Texas Law Review).
76. Scherer Interview, supra note 48, at 14.
77. Murphy Interview, supra note 51, at 4.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Poelker Interview, supra note 51, at 6.
80. Jim White suggests an alternate mechanism that might allow contractors as a group to price
projects in a way that reflects more sensitivity to risk than any individual contractor could achieve. He
suggests that contracts let by the most creditworthy developers will attract a larger number of bids, thus
forcing the price closer to the competitive equilibrium; contracts let by more doubtful developers might
attract fewer bids, resulting in less price competition and a greater potential for supra-competitive
pricing. See Letter from Professor James J. White, University of Michigan Law School, to Ronald J.
Mann, Washington University School of Law 2 (Mar. 20, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review).
Although none of my interviews provide any support for that suggestion, it does seem plausible. I
doubt, however, that it would provide the same effects as the careful risk assessment that is characteristic of sophisticated construction lenders.
81. See Interview with Richmond W. Coburn, Vice President, Commercial Real Estate Division,
The Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, in St. Louis, Mo. 3, 6 (July 6, 1995) [hereinafter Coburn
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Similarly, lenders frequently protect themselves by requiring an

assurance from a financially responsible third party that the general
contractor will complete construction of the project as required by its
contract: typically a performance bond from a third-party surety or a letter
of credit from a financial institution. The starting position for lenders is
to require a bond in the entire contract amount,' which is likely to cost
at least one-half of one percent of the amount of the contract, even for a
Frequently, however, a
contractor with exceptionally strong credit.'
lender will accept a less onerous assurance, especially in cases in which the
lender is impressed with the reputation or financial strength of the
contractor." For example, the lender might agree to accept a letter of

credit for a portion of the contract amount.8 Although a letter of credit

Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law Review) (explaining that interest rates on construction
loans would depend on, among other things, "how much equity the borrower is putting in," "how
strong they are financially," and the bank's previous relationship with the borrower); Telephone
Interview with Cynthia C. Sanford, Senior Vice President, NationsBank of Texas, N.A. 6 (July 20,
1995) [hereinafter Sanford Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law Review) (discussing "risk
profiles" of the project, property location, and previous relationship with borrower as factors in setting
interest rates); Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 3-5 (description by construction lender of factors
involved in setting interest rates).
82. See Interview with Carol C. Bllance, Real Estate Officer, and Richmond W. Coburn, Vice
President, Commercial Real Estate Division, The Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, in St. Louis,
Mo. 9 (Dec. 8, 1995) [hereinafter Ballance& Coburn Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law
Review) (explaining that the bond requirement "starts as a standard requirement," but that the lender
ends up getting the bond in only about half of its projects); Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 5
(stating a preference for insisting on bonds in transactions above the range of $3 million).
83. See, e.g., MurphyInterview, supranote 51, at5 (statement of the president of a subcontractor
that bond costs for his company are on a sliding scale starting at 0.75% and descending to just under
0.50%); Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 6 (statement of a construction consultant quoting rates
of "between one-half and seven-eighths of a point" on projects exceeding $100,000,000, "depending
upon how good the contractor is"); Poelker Interview, supra note 51, at 3 (statement of a general
contractor describing a sliding scale starting at 0.90% and descending to 0.40%); Scherer Interview,
supra note 48, at 4 (statement of the chief financial officer of a large contractor that bonds typically
costhis company about 0.50% of the contract amount); 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 45, § 12.2,
at 159 n.7 (outlining a "typical" declining schedule of bond prices with a marginal cost that always
exceeds 0.50%: 1% of the first $100,000, 0.65% of the next $2.4 million, and 0.525% of the next
$3.5 million).
84. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 10 (statement of lending officers that they
"certainly" will not accept a letter of credit if they "are not altogether comfortable with [the general
contractor]"); Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 13 (explaining that the willingness to permit a
departure from the bonding requirement is "a function of whether or not we know the contractors");
Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 6-8, 12-13 (discussing the importance of the reputation of contractors in assessing a lender's willingness to make a construction loan without requiring a surety bond).
85. Because an issuer's payment obligation under a letter of credit is more absolute than the
obligation of a surety to pay on a performancebond, I expected that construction lenders would prefer
letters of credit to surety bonds. For evidencethat industry professionals recognize the differing levels
of legal obligation, see Interview with T. Barton French, Sr., in St. Louis, Mo. 6-7 (Jan. 9, 1996)
[hereinafter French Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law Review) (statement of a prominent
retired St. Louis lender explaining the losses his bank took when it was forced to pay on a letter of
credit issued to back up a construction contract, even though a bonding company could have avoided
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is likely to cost more per dollar than a bond,8 6 the total cost tends to be
cheaper because lenders tend to accept letters of credit for relatively small

fractions of the contract amount.'

Finally, in cases of exemplary

strength, the lender might waive entirely any secondary assurance of performance by the general contractor.8" That is particularly common in
relatively small transactions, which tend to be performed by relatively
small general contractors that tend (without regard to the details of their
financial record) to be unable to obtain surety bonds." Those practices

indicate that a contractor can achieve considerable cost savings if it is able
to satisfy a lender that it is sufficiently stable to justify a waiver of the
bond requirement.

My interviews suggest that those cost savings are

payment in the same circumstances) and Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 7 ("The argument for
[a letter of credit] is that instant cash is better than a lawsuit against a solvent or insolvent bonding
company."). Part of my expectationwas fulfilled: lenders shared my view about the strong predilection
of sureties to avoid payment. See, e.g., Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 9 (statement
of an experienced lender that he knew of no one who successfully had sued a surety company on a payment and performancebond); Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 6 (characterizing surety companies
as "terrible" and stating that "we've never succeeded in [enforcing collection on a performance bond],
where they actually came and finished a job [and] took whatever lumps there were"); French Interview,
supra, at 4 ("[T]he underwriters at a bonding company told me years ago that their premiums are so
reasonable because they expect no actuarial loss ....
That means that they will fight it until the
highest court tells them to pay."); see also 2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 45, § 12.2, at 160-62
(describing legal doctrines that enable a surety to avoid payment on a performance bond).
Nevertheless, one of the lenders who criticized sureties for their unwillingness to perform on
their bonds still preferred surety bonds to letters of credit, apparently because of the perception that the
surety called upon to issue a bond would do a more careful job of evaluating the credit of the contractor
than a bank called upon to issue a letter of credit. See Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 6-7, 13.
86. The chief financial officer of one fiscally strong contractor told me that his company's cost
for a letter of credit is usually about 0.75% of the amount of the letter of credit per year while its cost
for a performance bond is a one-time charge of 0.50% of the bond amount. Scherer Interview, supra
note 48, at 5.
87. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 9, 11 (stating that cost is "usually the
explanation that's given" when borrowers prefer letters of credit, and that the typical amount of the
letter of credit is one-third to one-quarter of the amount of the construction contract); Mueller
Interview, supra note 50, at 5-6 (explaining that the primary reason that contractors prefer letters of
credit to bonds is that the letter of credit is cheaper); see also id. at 13 (suggesting that a letter of credit
for 15% of the contract amount would be typical); Scherer Interview, supra note 48, at 4-5 (offering
an example of a letter of credit for 5% of the contract amount).
88. See, e.g., Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 10-11 (statement of a lender
emphasizing the reputation of a general contractor as the key to a waiver of bond and letter of credit);
Poelker Interview, supra note 51, at 4 (statement of an officer at a general contractor that his company
has done jobs financed by third-party construction lenders without having to obtain a bond); Scherer
Interview, supra note 48, at 4 (statement of an officer at a general contractor that bonds or letters of
credit are "almost" always required by construction lenders); Wielansky Interview, supra note 55, at
2 (statement by a successful developer that "[t]here's no lender that makes us [get a performance
bond]").
89. See Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 6-7 (explaining that his bank typically does not require
performance bonds because the borrowers are, for the most part, small, local contracting companies);
see also French Interview, supra note 85, at 3-4 (reporting a general absence of bonds in small construction transactions).
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enough to make a considerable difference in competition for construction
work.90
A third way in which lenders can discriminate in protecting against the
risk that a project will fail is in establishing the terms of creditenhancement devices such as guaranties. It is normal in the constructionloan context for lenders to obtain some form of guaranty or other individual liability from the individual principals of the borrowers. 91 But on
a case-by-case basis lenders may agree to provisions that allow that recourse liability to dissipate even before the loan has been repaid. For
example, it is not unusual for a lender to agree that the principal will bear
only "partial" recourse liability, so that the lender can sue the borrower's
principal personally only for a stated sum or a stated percentage of the loan
amount.'
Similarly, negotiations over the conditions under which that
recourse liability will "bum down" are one of the focal points of negotiations of a construction loan, and one of the key points on which lenders
compete against each other for business.93 Finally, in exceptional cases
the strength of the borrower alone is sufficient that the lender might be
willing to waive the guarantee requirement entirely.'
In sum, actual contracting practices coincide with the prediction of my
model. Contractors (acting individually to further their fractionated
interests) respond to credit risks in a relatively blunt manner. Lenders, by
contrast, use much more precise mechanisms to adjust the terms of transactions on a case-by-case basis to account for the risk of nonpayment.
Because the relatively precise adjustment by lenders (and relatively blunt

90. One lender who specialized in relatively small commercial construction loans explained that
point as follows: "[W]hat it comes down to is that we have dealt with that guy before and he tried to
screw us or screw our customer and so we're leaving him out of our preferred list. There's no list
written down, it's just a matter of who we know is good and who we know is not good." Wood
Interview, supra note 41, at 8; see also id. at 12-13 (further discussing the importanceof the reputation
of contractors in assessing the need for bonds). The contractor's perspective is similar. One
contractor's vice president for finance assured me that his company frequently has the low bid on jobs
solely because of his company's relatively favorable bond rate. See Poelker Interview, supra note 51,
at 4.
91. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 23 (describing the importance of
guaranties-to construction lenders); Coburn Interview, supra note 81, at 3-4 (noting that the lender
"always conditionally required recourse"); Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 5 (statement of a construction lender that it has a "cardinal rule" requiring personal guarantees by the principals of the
borrower).
92. See Coburn Interview, supra note 81, at 4 (acknowledging that lenders on occasion will agree
to partial-recourse financing).
93. See Sanford Interview, supra note 81, at 7 (describing competition among lenders for
construction loans based on willingness to "bum down" recourse liability). That point is strongly
supported by my experience on a recent $30 million shopping center construction loan transaction, in
which the extent and duration of recourse liability were the key points in the negotiations over the
business terms of the construction loan.
94. See Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 6.
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adjustment by contractors) occurs for the most part in an environment in
which the risk of loss by lenders is diminished by their general ability to
obtain priority under the first-in-time system, that evidence firmly supports
my view that adoption of my contractor-first priority rule would result in
enhanced care in risk assessment: lenders would be even more careful
about adjustment in a system in which they bore the initial risk of loss than
they are under the first-in-time system that is currently dominant.'
b. Controllingrisk.-The second problem with first-in-time priority in the construction-loan context is that it limits incentives to control
the risk of loss during the course of construction and disbursement.
Specifically, the model presented in subpart H1(A) predicts that the parties
will take more care to prevent losses during the course of disbursement if
the primary risk of loss is on the construction lender than they will if the
primary risk of loss is on the contractors as a group.
The main risk of loss during the course of disbursement is that the
owner or general contractor will divert the funds from the project for
which they have been disbursed. That can happen for any of a number of
reasons. The owner or contractor might be experiencing cost overruns on
another project and want to spend the funds to defray costs on that project;
it might need the funds to meet other personal expenses; or it might simply
want to "steal"' the money and start a new life in another community.
Whatever the cause of the problem, contractors are not often in a very
good position to protect themselves from diversion. The general contractor
does not typically have any control over funds until the owner has refrained
from diverting them, and subcontractors, in turn, do not typically have any
control over funds until both the owner and the general contractor have
refrained from diverting them. Thus, about the most that a contractor can
do to prevent losses from diversion of funds is to try to obtain assurances
from parties further up the chain that they will segregate funds for the
contractor's benefit.' That practice, however, protects at best a limited
portion of the funds-the funds due to the contractor that obtains the
assurance.

98

95. For discussion of evidence regarding what lenders actually do under such a system, see infra
section II(B)(2).
96. "Steal" is a harsh term for the diversion of money that technically belongs to the owner or
contractor, but it does reflect the sentiments of the lender and the subcontractors.
97. See Gallup Interview, supra note 75, at 4-5 (recommending the use of escrow funds as a way
to protect the contractor from the defalcation or insolvency of a developer or an owner); Scherer
Interview, supra note 48, at 8 (statement of the chief financial officer of a large general contractor
explaining that his company sometimes "will insist that the lender write us a letter ... indicating that
the money for our contract has been segregated in the loan and set aside purely for our purposes so that
the developer or the owner can't use it for any other purpose").
98. Legislative responses normally treat the diversion as a criminal offense and also typically grant
the contractor a lien on the project. See LoPucKi & WARREN, supra note 16, at 652. Assuming that
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By contrast, it is quite common for lenders to use a variety of techniques to control the risk of diversion by the developer and the general

contractor. The most common is to condition disbursement of funds on
presentation of a draw request that includes a schedule of invoices from
contractors, to attempt to ensure that funds are disbursed only for work that
actually has been done." A related technique (common on smaller projects) provides for draws of specific sums of money upon completion of
predefined portions of the work: pouring the slab, enclosing the roof, and

the like.100 As a related requirement, lenders generally will not disburse
the entire amount of the invoices, but instead will "hold back" or retain

some percentage of those amounts as a fund to protect against future problems.' "° Similarly, lenders typically insist that the draw request include
lien waivers from all contractors working on the job, indicating that they
have been paid for all work they previously have done on the project."°
Furthermore, in some cases the lender will insist on an escrow arrangement
in which the funds are disbursed directly to the respective contractors.")

the lien is subordinate to the lien of the construction lender, neither of those devices goes far to protect
the contractor.
99. See, e.g., Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 14-15 (describing the procedure
for draw requests that requires evidence of work doneby specific contractors); Bonita Interview, supra
note 41, at 3-4 (noting accounting procedures designed to "see to it month by month that all the trad[e
creditors] were being paid" and explaining that "the mechanics' lien risk has been reduced by orders
of magnitude by seeing to it that everybody's paid"); Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 2-4
(describing procedures for reviewing draw requests consisting of invoice submission and review by an
independent architect as a condition to the disbursement of construction-loan proceeds); Wielansky
Interview, supra note 55, at 3 (describing a process in which contractors and subcontractors submit a
monthly "componentized breakdown" of need before loan proceeds are disbursed). For textbook discussions, see FRANK P. JOHNSON & RICHARD D. JOHNSON, BANK MANAGEMENT 223 (1983), and
MICHAEL T. MADISON & ROBERT M. ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCING: A
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 645-50 (1991) (both describing the construction-loan disbursement
process).
100. See, e.g., LoPUcIU & WARREN, supra note 16, at 651.
101. See, e.g., MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 99, at 649 (stating that a 5-15% holdback or
retainage is typical); Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 15 (discussing policies that
typically require 10% retainage, but sometimes require only 5% retainage after completion of 50% of
the work); Bonita Interview, supra note 41, at 4 (stating that there is generally a 10% holdback on
payments for labor and services).
102. See, e.g., MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 99, at 648 (describing the requirement "that
[contractors] waive their lien rights for work and materials for which they have received payments");
2 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 45, § 12.4, at 191-92 (characterizing the lien-waiver procedure as
"extremely useful to owners and construction lenders"); Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82,
at 16-17 (describing the requirement of month-by-month lien waivers); Mueller Interview, supra note
50, at 3 (describing the requirement that contractors seeking payment waive any claim for work done
in previous months); Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at I (describing the practice of paying
contractors "on a one-month lag basis [and] keeping] them honest, before they get their next money,
with lien waivers"); VWielansky Interview, supra note 55, at 3 (describing the requirement that
subcontractors sign "waivers that [they] have been paid from the previous draw").
103. See MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 99, at 650; Scherer Interview, supra note 48, at 8.
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That procedure may be expensive, 104 but it limits the risk of diversion
considerably. The main point, though, is that construction lenders choose
from a range of procedures that can protect more (or less) carefully against
the risk of diversion. Their ability to choose procedures with varying levels
of expense and intrusiveness gives them a considerable flexibility to take
account of the perceived riskiness of the transaction.
2. Responding to Risk in a Contractor-FirstWorld.-My view that a
contractor-first system would lead to more attention to risk is bolstered
significantly by the perspectives of parties who already operate under such
a system. At least one state (Missouri) already has rules that approximate
that system."05 I interviewed lenders from three institutions that make
construction loans in both types of jurisdictions: Missouri (where construction lenders are subordinate) and other states (where construction lenders
generally have priority). All of those lenders are aware of the difference
in the legal regimes and understand that the Missouri rule puts them at a
greater risk of loss." ° When I asked them if the rule discourages them

104. See Ballance & Cobum Interview, supra note 82, at 16 (explaining that it is cheaper for the
general contractor to cut individual checks than for the lender to do it). The vice president for finance
for one contractor explained that disbursement controls are expensive not only because of the costs of
the procedure itself, but also because they deprive the general contractor of the ability to use
disbursement as a device to reward superior and punish inferior performance by its subcontractors.
Poelker Interview, supra note 51, at 4. In particular, he complained that disbursement controls
effectively deprive him of the ability to police subpar work that becomes evident after the time for
submitting a draw request. Id.
105. See H.B. Deal Constr. Co. v. Labor Discount Ctr., Inc., 418 S.W.2d 940, 953-54 (Mo.
1967) (holding that principles of equity require subordination of the lien of a lender that funds
construction to the liens of parties that supply labor and materials to the project). One of the most
interesting aspects of this project was my learning that the cursory and ambiguous decision in H.B.
Deal has resulted in a broad understanding in the industry that Missouri law is set firmly against
construction lenders in this context. That understanding ranges from the leading legal commentators,
see R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAaE LAW AND PRAcncE § 214, at 138-40 (1972) (noting
Missouri's "curious" rule on that issue), to title insurers, see Bonita Interview, supra note 41, at 11
(statement of a chief underwriting counsel for an insurer that issues insurance in all domestic
jurisdictions where it is lawful, describing Missouri's mechanics' lien laws as the "nastiest" in the
nation); Telephone Interview with Jim Gosdin, Stewart Title Guaranty Company 2-3 (Jan. 11, 1996)
[hereinafter Gosdin Interview] (transcript on file with the Texas Law Review) (stating that his company
does not issue mechanics' lien coverage in Missouri because of past losses), to nonlawyer executives,
see Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 3-4 (statement of a disbursement advisor with experience in
"23 or 24" states that "there is no mechanics' lien situation in the country any tougher than Missouri").
Dale Whitman has pointed out to me that the conventional understanding of H.B. Deal as a commonlaw decision is difficult to reconcile with the actual setting of the case. In his view, the unique outcome
is attributable to an unusual provision of Missouri statutory law that mandates that construction liens
be subordinated to labor and service liens. See Letter from Professor Dale A. Whitman, Brigham
Young University Law School, to Ronald I. Mann, Washington University School of Law 2-3 (Apr.
2, 1996) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 429.050 (1994)).
106. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 4; French Interview, supra note 85, at
1-2; Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 2, 13-14.
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from doing construction loans in Missouri, all had the same general
response: they are willing to make loans in Missouri despite the lower
priority, but they are more careful about risk there than they are in jurisdictions where they have a better priority position."' 7 That increased care
is exactly what the system should seek because that increased attention to
risk results in pricing that more accurately reflects the value of individual
construction projects.
The primary way that lenders deal with the increased risk appears to
be through increased care in the disbursement process.10 Indeed, one
lender told me that the system under which lenders themselves disburse
funds to the individual contractors originated as a specific response to the
contractor-first priority rules adopted in Missouri, based on the idea that
control over disbursement was necessary to make it acceptable to bear the
risk of construction lending in a contractor-first system."°9
Another response to the contractor-first priority system comes from
title insurers. Whether contractors or lenders have priority, lenders
generally try to pass the risk of loss from competing claimants to a title
insurance company. The traditional way of transferring that risk is to
obtain an endorsement to a title-insurance policy that insures the lender
against any loss the lender suffers from a contractor obtaining a lien that
In states where the legal system permits
defeats the lien of the lender."
lenders to obtain priority over the contractors, the risk of the insurer in
offering such insurance is essentially a procedural one: the insurer is at risk
only if the lender fails to follow the procedures necessary to obtain priority
over the contractors."' By contrast, the risk is much more substantive
in a system (like the one in Missouri) in which the contractors have prior-

107. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 23 (stating that the harshness of Missouri
lien rules "would be reflected in the procedural requirements in our construction loan agreement");
French Interview, supra note 85, at 1-2 (observing that disbursing controls were implemented in
Missouri in response to the risk of loss to contractors' liens); Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 2
(stating that he accounts for the increased risk "primarily through the disbursing process").
108. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 23 (rejecting the possibility of higher
interest rates or guaranties to accommodate priority risk, and explaining: "No, no, the only changes
you're going to see would be reflected in the procedural requirements in our construction loan
agreement."); Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 2 (noting the use of detailed loan agreements and
third-party inspections to protect disbursements); Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 4 (suggesting
that Missouri's priority system has caused the development of "extraordinary rules about the handling
of money"). Petersen's suggestion is supported by the statement of one general contractor that he
frequently was asked to submit to disbursing controls in Missouri but never had been asked to submit
to such an arrangement on work that he did in Illinois. See Poelker Interview, supra note 51, at 5.
109. See French Interview, supra note 85, at 1-2.
110. See MADISON & ZINMAN, supra note 99, at 635-36 (describing typical title-insurance
requirements for construction loans); Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 4-5; Mueller
Interview, supra note 50, at 4-5 (statements of lending executives that they always insist on titleinsurance coverage to protect against contractor claims, whether or not the loan is in Missouri).
111. See Gosdin Interview, supra note 105, at 3.
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ity over the lender as a matter of law. In that system, the lender and the
insurer are at risk whenever a party performs work on the project without
being paid.112 The result is that lenders and title insurers in Missouri
tend to monitor disbursement of the loan proceeds with more care than they
do in other states,1 frequently insisting that they supervise any dis-

bursement of proceeds to ensure that all of the insured loan amount is
expended to pay parties providing work on the project, and that none of the
funds are diverted to other purposes or projects." 4
Those procedures may be expensive: various individuals reported a

standard charge by a title company ranging from 0.50 % to 1% of the loan

amount for monitoring the disbursement.1 5 But I see no reason to believe that the costs are wasted. Although one of the lenders suggested that
the charge was "standard," it is clear that title-insurance companies do not
insist on supervising disbursement in all cases. On the contrary, in cases

112. I was surprised to learn from the chief underwriting counsel of a major national title insurer
that title insurers frequently accept that same risk voluntarily in other states, by issuing mechanics' lien
coverage even in cases in which they know that the mechanics will have priority, most commonly because construction commenced before the time of the loan. Bonita Interview, supranote 41, at 3, 5-6;
see also Gosdin Interview, supra note 105, at 6 (describing situations in which there was "a decision
to provide coverage" in the face of a known problem).
113. See, e.g., Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 2 (stating that the "disbursing process" is the
primary way that lenders respond to the risk that mechanics' liens will have priority over their liens
under a contractor-first priority system); Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 3, 5, 3-5 (suggesting that
obtaining adequate coverage in other states is "a piece of cake" compared to obtaining coverage in
Missouri and that insurers in other jurisdictions "don't pay much attention" to issues that would be
'routine" requirements in Missouri).
114. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 8 (statement of lending executives who
had dealt with the same title insurance company in multiple states that the title insurance company's
disbursement procedure outside Missouri "was not nearly as tough as in Missouri"); Bonita Interview,
supra note 41, at 5 (statement of the chief underwriting counsel for a major national title insurer
agreeing that he analyzes the economics of a project more carefully in states where the contractors have
priority over the insured construction lender's lien); Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 2 (stating that
one of the three or four title insurance companies that issues mechanics' lien coverage in Missouri
'almost always insists that they handle the money"); Wood Interview, supra note 41, at 9-10 (statement
of a lending executive who specializes in relatively small commercial construction loans that he generally requires use of that procedure on Missouri transactions above $250,000). Indeed, the risks are so
substantial that some insurers refuse entirely to do business in states where the priority of the lender
is not sufficiently clear. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 7-8 (stating that "only a
handful" of companies will issue mechanics' lien coverage on large commercial projects in Missouri);
Gosdin Interview, supra note 105, at 2 (explaining that his company refuses to issue mechanics' lien
coverage in several states (including Missouri) because past losses suggest that the risk is unacceptably
high).
115. Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 24-25; French Interview, supra note 85, at
2 (both offering 1% as a standard fee); Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 2-3 (offering 0.50% as
a standard fee). There does not appear to be any savings in lower expenditures by the lender because
lenders appear to review the draw requests just as carefully even if the title-insurance company is
making the actual disbursements. See Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 24-26
(explanation of construction lending executives that "we don't put as much faith in the title companies
when it comes to the nuts and bolts as maybe some people think we do").
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in which parties of unquestioned financial probity and strength are involved, lenders and title companies alike are much more lenient about the
disbursement process. 16 For example, an officer at one major title
insurer explained that his company does not universally insist that it control
disbursements. Instead, it decides how cautious it will be after assessing
the economics of the project and the experience of the general contractor
and developer. 17 That insurer's perception is consistent with the practices reported by financially strong developers, as well as those that lend
to them. For example, one shopping-center developer to whom I spoke
indicated that lenders and title insurers typically trust it to cut the individual
checks to the various contractors to whom payment is due.'
Finally,
an experienced Missouri lender reported that the title insurance company
normally will not insist on controlling disbursement if the contractor and
the developer "were really strong financially.""'
In sum, the end result is the same as my model predicts: pressures of
the market lead to a relatively sensitive discrimination in contracting
practices that expends greater efforts to limit losses in riskier transactions
but is more lenient in safer transactions.
Ill. Trading Adjustment Against Other Concerns
A.

Balancing Simplicity and Adjustment

Although Part II explains the adjustment-related benefits of a rule
giving contractors priority over construction lenders, the case for that rule
is not complete until I address the possibility that my rule is not optimal
because of the complexity that it adds to the credit system. As I explain
above, the first-in-time priority rule compares favorably to many systems
that determine priority based on nontemporal factors (like possession)
because a first-in-time system allows parties to obtain priority and determine that they have priority at a relatively low cost."2 If my rule

116. See Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 2 (suggesting that title companies evaluate "the
credit reputation of the contractor and the strength of the owner" in deciding what coverage to issue).
117. ee Bonita Interview, supra note 41, at 6; Petersen Interview, supra note 52, at 2 (suggesting
that insurers decide whether to insure a job "based upon the strength of the indemnities they get out
of the contractor and the owner").
118. See Wielansky Interview, supra note 55, at 3-4.
119. See French Interview, supra note 85, at 3.
120. See supra section I(A)(1). That point is crucial to my general thoughts about lien priority
because it is the center of my skepticism about the "tort-first" movement. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text (citing representative tort-first literature). Specifically, I doubt that a simple
elevation of the priority of all creditors whose claims technically sound in tort would produce satisfactory results because I believe that many tort creditors in fact have a practicable opportunity to adjust
to priority losses in setting the terms of their relationship with the tortfeasor. For that reason, I doubt
that elevating all tort creditors above secured creditors would improve the efficiency of the credit
system.
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theoretically increases the ability of parties to adjust and account for risk,
but at the same time makes the system unacceptably complicated, then my
proposal would not be superior to a pure first-in-time system. Although
reasonable minds could differ, this subpart explains my view that the
system that I propose would not significantly increase the costs that parties
expend to obtain and evaluate their priority position.
First, I see no reason to believe that construction lenders or contractors would spend any more on obtaining priority under my system than
they do under the system that dominates current practice. Construction
lenders undoubtedly still would search the real-estate records to ensure that
they are aware of all prior liens not related to their project. Nor does it
seem reasonable to suppose that the elevation of contractors to higher
priority would give contractors an incentive to conduct any more lien
searches than they do now.
Similarly, I doubt that my system would leave parties in any significantly greater doubt about their priority than the current system. Even if
construction lenders cannot discover the claims of contractors by searching
the real-estate records before they make their loans (because those claims
would not yet exist), they have no reason to be surprised when the contractors subsequently appear and do work: it is inconceivable that a reputable
lender would make a construction loan without a detailed understanding of
the work to be done by the major contractors, as well as the amounts anticipated to be paid to each of them.12 The construction lender may not
be able to predict in advance which (if any) of the contractors ultimately
will go unpaid, but that does not suggest a flaw in my proposal. The
difficulty of predicting losses is the problem that the current system does
not address adequately. Adoption of the contractor-first rule should make
that problem better, not worse, by bringing more appropriate incentives to
bear on that problem.
My view that a contractor-priority rule is workable is strongly supported by the perspectives of businesspeople who work in both lender-first
and contractor-first systems. I spoke to contractors, borrowers, lenders,
and title insurers that work on transactions in both lender-first and
contractor-first systems. I heard little or no concern about the workability
None identified any difficulty beyond
of the contractor-first system."

121. Construction lenders are surprisingly sanguine about their ability to identify all of the parties
on the construction site. See Mueller Interview, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of a construction lender
that he typically has a detailed understanding of the contractors and subcontractors who will be working
on the project and the amounts of their contracts). Even if they are not so capable as they believe, I
do think that it is fair to believe that any reasonably competent construction lender will have a detailed
understanding of at least the major expenses to be paid and their recipients.
122. The single exceptionwas a title insurance professional who indicated that his employer's loss
experience on mechanics' lien coverage in contractor-first states like Missouri had caused it to stop
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the one I discussed above: it has a tendency to increase the costs of
construction lending in cases in which the borrower and the contractor have
less than redoubtable financial strength." But I see that as a benefit, not
a detriment. Assuming that the parties are acting rationally,"2 they
would not be incurring the costs if they were not appropriate to protect
against significant risks of loss. If the costs of protecting against those
losses increase the costs of high-risk projects in comparison to the costs of
low-risk projects, that does not suggest a problem with the system. It
suggests that the system is working exactly as it should, to make sure that
projects that involve large risks of loss bear prices that reflect those risks.
Finally, if there is any concern about the uncertainty of a system under
which unidentified contractors can gain unanticipated priority over the lien
of a construction lender, I must point out that even the broad defense of
first-in-time priority for construction lenders in the Restatement contemplates a loophole that leaves open the possibility of priority for contractors
in circumstances that are much less certain than those I propose.
Specifically, the Restatement suggests that courts should
impos[e] . .. a duty of good faith and fair dealing on construction

lenders, so that those who injure junior lienors by the use of
negligent or lax disbursement procedures are held liable for the
losses they cause. Elevation of the junior lienors' priority is an
appropriate way to impose that liability.1"
The twofold motivation for that approach is commendable: it offers a rule
that plausibly could be adopted by courts without statutory enactment, and

issuing title-insurance coverage in those states. It is clear, however, that other insurers are happy to
provide that insurance. See, e.g., Ballance & Coburn Interview, supra note 82, at 8 (listing title
insurance companies willing to issue that coverage on commercial projects in Missouri); Bonita
Interview, supra note 41, at 3 (statement of the chief underwriting counsel for Chicago Title Insurance
Company remarking that Chicago Title is willing to issue that coverage in Missouri); Petersen
Interview, supra note 52, at 2 (statement of a disbursement adviser noting that "there are three or four
companies" that issue that coverage in Missouri). My assessment of the situation is that it is not profitable to issue the coverage unless the insurer is willing to devote the resources to ensure that it has
trained employees capable of dealing with the unique problems of the system. The fact that several
companies do so suggests that it is feasible for title insurers to accommodate the risks in question.
123. It would be extraordinarily difficult to determine by direct observation whether an alteration
of the priority rules changes the price of construction loans or the price of newly constructed buildings.
The immense number of factors that go into determining the cost of any particular loan or project, including the effects of all of the relevant legal rules, would make it very difficult to attempt to isolate
the effect of a change in rules of lien priority. I do think, however, that the anecdotal evidence
presented in this Article supports my view that an alteration of the rule of priority would have the
beneficial effects that my model predicts.
124. The sophistication of the parties and the amount of money they have at stake convince me
that their actions are not far from rational.
125. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 2.3, Reporters' Note, at 100-01 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1991). Because that discussion appears in a reporters' note rather than the body of the Restatement or
its comments, it does not reflect the views of The American Law Institute. Telephone Interview with
Grant Nelson, Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property-Sec. (Mortgages)(Mar. 4, 1996).
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it would provide some enhancement of the lender's incentive to adopt the
kinds of risk assessment and control procedures that are the focus of my
proposal.
But the uncertainty inherent in that system would prevent it from
working nearly so cleanly as my proposal. Because it relies on a completely open-ended standard-a duty of "good faith and fair dealing " "s
to be violated by "the use of negligent or lax disbursement procedures" and
with an alteration of priority as an "appropriate" remedy-that proposal in
fact would create a strong likelihood of the kind of expensive and timeconsuming litigation that a first-in-time rule is supposed to avoid." z My
broader proposal, by comparison, would provide a clear rule of contractor
priority that should minimize the need for litigation about priority issues.
Construction lenders may not know in advance the amount of unpaid
contractors' claims that will be associated with any particular project. But
they do have the incentive and the ability to obtain detailed information
about the work that will be done and thus to form reliable estimates
regarding the risk that contractors will go unpaid. That system may not be
as certain and simple as a pure first-in-time system, but empirical evidence
suggests that it is completely practicable. Moreover, it definitely is more
certain than either the system we have now" or the system described in
the Restatement. Given the potential for a contractor-first priority system
to enhance risk assessment and control, it is fair to say that changing to
that system would bring an improvement over current rules.
B.

Adjustment and Other Costs: The CaseAgainstFixed-FractionPriority

Where the Restatement responds to the difficulties that exist in current
construction law by enhancing the priority of first-in-time construction
lenders, Lucian Bebcluk and Jesse Fried recently argued in the Yale Law
Journal that the general problem of nonadjusting creditors justifies a

126. The use of a duty of "good faith and fair dealing" as a tool to protect contractors is
particularly debilitating to the lenders' ability to estimate future costs because of the possibility that
violations of that duty will result in punitive or other extracompensatory damages. The Restatement
offers nothing to dispel that concern. For a contemporaneous decision that the need to allow lenders
to estimate costs justifies a limitation on the availability of extracompensatory damages, see U.C.C.
§ 5-111 & cmt. 4 (1995) (rejecting the availability of consequential, punitive, and exemplary damages
for wrongful dishonor or repudiation of a letter of credit).
127. For a similar reaction to a proposal by Professor LoPucki that would subject first-in-time
secured creditors to a vague and uncabined subordination, see Susan Block-Lieb, The Unsecured
Creditor'sBargain:A Reply, 80 VA. L. REV. 1989, 2014 (1994):
In many instances, however, the law accepts a degree of imprecision when it embraces
a prophylactic rule rather than a factual standard-the imprecision of an objective standard
often is overlooked as less problematic than both the uncertainty created ex ante and the
judicial effort required ex post by a subjective standard.
128. For sources discussing the ambiguity of the current system, see supra note 42.
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reform in the opposite direction, a partial limitation of priority for first-intime secured creditors. Under their proposal, first-in-time secured creditors would retain some priority, but a portion of the value of their
collateral would be allocated to nonadjusting creditors.129
Bebchuk and Fried offer two different ways of calculating the fund
available for later-in-time creditors. The first is an adjustable-priority rule,
under which "claims of nonadjusting creditors would not be subordinated
to secured claims with respect to which they were nonadjusting." t °
They abandon that proposal, however, principally because "it would clearly
not be feasible to determine whether each creditor had in fact 'adjusted' to
each particular security interest.""' They recognize that it would be
possible theoretically to identify particular classes of creditors entitled to
priority (tort and small-dollar claimants, to use their examples), but end up
rejecting that approach because it would leave secured creditors uncertain
of the magnitude of the debts in front of them, and thus uncertain of the
value of their security interest: after all, it is difficult for a secured creditor
at the time it makes a loan to predict the dollar value of claims to be held
by future small-dollar claimants. 32 Their second proposal is for a fixedfraction priority rule, under which a secured creditor would have priority
only to the extent of a fixed fraction of its claim (they suggest seventy-five
percent, the figure they say is used in an analogous German proposal). 33
They acknowledge that a decrease in the priority of secured creditors
would vitiate some of the efficiency benefits of secured credit, but argue
that benefits flowing from the increased potential for adjustment under their
fixed-fraction priority scheme justify its adoption as a reasonable
compromise. 34
At least in the context I discuss in this Article, my contractor-first
proposal is superior to the fixed-fraction priority rule that Bebchuk and
Fried support. The basic difference between that proposal and mine is that
theirs gives the second-in-time creditors partial relief from first-in-time
priority, where I would alter the priority completely. They do not expressly state their reasons for supporting only a partial inversion of
priority, but the limitation of their proposal to a partial alteration of
priority appears to represent a compromise designed to increase the poten-

129. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 909-34.
130. Id. at 905-09.
131. Id. at 908.
132. See id. at 908-09 (noting that such an approach would create uncertainty for secured
creditors).
133. Id. at 909-11 (citing Jochen Drukarczyk, Secured Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Creditors'
BargainModel, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 205 (1991)). The fixed-fraction priority scheme
closely resembles a plan proposed in England during the early 1980s. See John Hudson, The Case
Against SecuredLending, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 47, 59 (1995) (discussing the English proposal).
134. Bebehuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 913-23.
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tial for adjustment and at the same time minimize the uncertainty costs that
would be associated with an adjustable-priority regime. As I explained
above, however, my proposal does not inflict the kinds of uncertainty costs
that would accompany their adjustable-priority regime. My proposal does
not leave the construction lender behind the vague and undefinable classes
of creditors discussed by Bebchuk and Fried: tort and small-dollar claimants.135 Rather, my proposal leaves the construction lender behind a
class of creditors holding claims in an amount that the construction lender
has a practical ability to predict and control.' 36 In light of the ready
ability of construction lenders to operate in a similar system now, I see no
reason to believe that adoption of my proposal would undermine the certainty of the system significantly.
Bebchuk and Fried also identify three efficiency costs of partial
priority, which (they suggest) cut against any proposal to depart from firstin-time priority, and thus provide a factor limiting the size of the fraction
of collateral value to be allocated to second-in-time creditors. 137 My
proposal does not significantly implicate any of those concerns. The first
is increased information-acquisition costs, by which Bebchuk and Fried
mean expenditures incurred to evaluate risk.'38 My proposal would be
likely to bring an increase in the expenditures to evaluate the risk, but that
is only because the current system's fractionation of the risk of loss
artificially (and inappropriately) depresses the incentive to respond to risk.
By uniting the highest possible portion of the risk of loss in the construction lender, my proposal gives a single party an incentive to expend
funds to evaluate risk whenever the expenditure appears likely to produce
information sufficiently valuable to justify the expenditure. Thus, although
my proposal should increase expenditures, the new expenditures should be
value-increasing, and thus their existence does not suggest a defect in my
proposal.
The second cost that Bebchuk and Fried identify is the increased cost
of coordinating monitoring efforts among creditors.' 39 On that point, my
proposal actually should improve matters over the current system, again
because it unites the risk in a single party. Under the current system,
effective monitoring is hindered by the costs that the parties that bear the

135. See id. at 908-09.
136. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of construction lenders to
identify the amount of potential adverse claims).
137. I provide a different (and considerably more extensive) categorization of the benefits of
priority for secured creditors in Mann, supra note 1. Because my present purpose is to respond to the
analysis presented by Bebchuk and Fried, I organize the discussion here according to the framework
that they present.
138. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 914-15.
139. Id. at 915-17.
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bulk of the risk of loss would have to incur to reach agreements on monitoring and risk assessment.'
My proposal, by contrast, would put the
bulk of the risk of loss on a single party, thus reducing substantially the
need to incur those costs.
The final possible cost of limiting first-in-time priority identified by
Bebchuk and Fried is the possible reduction in financing for desirable
activities.' 4 ' On that point, however, they conclude (as I argue here),
that a reduction of first-in-time priority that enhances adjustment in fact
increases efficiency because the activities from which financing is likely to
be withdrawn are activities that could have been financed only through the
externalization of the risk of loss to nonadjusting creditors.'42 That
point, if anything, demonstrates why my proposal is superior to the fixedfraction priority proposal Bebchuk and Fried advance. For the same reason that a fractional limitation of first-in-time priority provides some
enhancement of the incentive to adjust, my priority-flipping proposal
provides the most complete possible enhancement of that incentive because
it puts a much greater share of the risk of loss on a single party, bringing
the incentive to incur the costs necessary to make a prudent adjustment as
close as practicable to the socially optimal level.

In a sense, it is unfair to compare my proposal to the fixed-fraction
proposal that Bebchuk and Fried articulate. Their project aims to provide
an abstract general analysis of priority questions, and thus they have no
occasion to consider the context-dependent reasons I can advance to support
my proposal. But the difference of analysis goes deeper than the scope of
individual projects. Attention to context is a fundamental part of my
approach, which rests on the premise that we can make no sense of commerce without attention to the rich variety of sophisticated commercial
practice. Because I start from that premise, I believe that it is fruitless to
try to design a system for commercial law without first understanding the
underlying commercial practices.' 43
Of course it could be counterproductive to create an open-ended
system with dozens of pigeonholes for all sorts of transactions: litigation
over the boundaries and propriety of the various pigeonholes could consume more resources than the contextualized rules could save. But I do

140. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
141. Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 9, at 917-21.
142. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 1910-11 (making a similar argument with respect to giving
priority to tort creditor:).
143. I have attempted to further that goal in the secured-credit context in my work on the general
pattern of secured credit, Mann, supra note 1.
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think that the analysis in this Article provides a first example of the way
in which contextualized analysis can bring significant benefits to the
system, by retooling a discrete area that currently is beset with complicated, inconsistent, and counterproductive rules.
IV. Conclusion
The programmatic thesis of this Article is simple: rules of lien priority
matter. And they matter not just because we care who wins and loses in
the struggles for survival in our economy. They matter because changing
the rules for lien priority can change significantly the incentives of the
parties governed by the rules, in ways that directly affect the allocation of
productive assets in our economy. In an era so troubled by what many
perceive to be an excessive rate of business failure, there is no excuse for
ignoring the effects that legal rules can have on the incentives of parties to
reduce the social dislocation of business failures. This Article shows how
priority rules can do just that.

